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What think you of [Hamilton's] commentary ... on the terms
"general welfare" ?-The federal Govt. has been hitherto limited
to the specified powers-If not only the means but the objects are
unlimited, the parchment had better be thrown into the fire at
once ....
-James Madison'
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties,
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States3
This is the Taxation Clause-the first in the Constitution's
enumeration of congressional powers. It has been controversial since it
first saw the light of day. The most controversial part of all has been the
phrase in the middle ("to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States"). It is called the
General Welfare Clause, and it is the subject of this Article.
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY
THE PEOPLE 1787-1788 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) [hereinafter Ford, ESSAYS].
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 1787-1788 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888) [hereinafter Ford,
PAMPHLETS].
THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON 1764-1774 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Da Capo
Press 1970) (1895) [hereinafter POLITICAL WRITINGS].
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST].
James H. Hutson, John Dickinson at the Federal Constitutional Convention, 40 WM. & MARY
Q. 256 (1983).
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Merrill Jensen et
al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755).
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1986), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/ [hereinafter THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION].
FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1985).
Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 NEV. L.J. 469 (2003).
C. Perry Patterson, The General Welfare Clause, 30 MINN. L. REV. 43 (1946).
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1996).
Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (Or The President's Paramour): An Examination of
the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States
Constitution, 33 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 81 (1999).
Aviam Soifer, Truisms That Never Will Be True: The Tenth Amendment and the Spending
Power, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 793 (1985).
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter Storing, ANTI-
FEDERALIST].
CHARLES J. STILLP, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON 1732-1808 (1969) (1891).
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (5th ed. 1891)
(2 vols.).
CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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The General Welfare Clause is one of the two principal
constitutional pillars supporting the modem federal welfare statea4-the
other being the Commerce Clause.5 While the Commerce Clause
supports most unfunded federal regulation, the General Welfare Clause is
said to include an implied spending power used to justify federal
6
spending programs and the regulatory conditions attached to them. For
that reason, the General Welfare Clause sometimes is called the
Spending Clause.
This Article examines the three traditional interpretations of the
General Welfare Clause. These are, first, that it is a plenary grant of
regulatory and spending power to Congress; second, that it is a plenary
grant of spending power only; and, third, that it is not a grant of power at
all. I find severe textual problems with the first and second
interpretations, and my subsequent historical analysis confirms that those
interpretations have little basis in original understanding. I find that the
third view is the most textually sound. Examination of history, however,
shows that the General Welfare Clause is more than a mere "non-grant"
of spending power. It was intended to be a sweeping denial of power-
specifically, it was intended to impose on Congress a standard of
impartiality borrowed from the law of trusts, thereby limiting the
legislature's capacity to "play favorites" with federal tax money.
Of course, some may argue that the United States Supreme Court
already has adopted an interpretation of the General Welfare Clause, and
that it has been settled for some time.' An academic response is that an
authoritative historical understanding of the Clause will help us assess
the forces that induced the Supreme Court to get its own version wrong
(or right). A practical response is this: One lesson of the late twentieth
century is that in politics (of which constitutional interpretation is
arguably a branch), the proposition that everything is settled is a safe bet
only for losers. The world is changing too fast to take any political
settlement for granted. Ask the people of East Berlin.
4. For a discussion of the use and interplay of the commerce and spending power and the
Tenth Amendment, see MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM 46-61, 80 (1999).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. The Supreme Court adopted this position by dicta in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,
64-66 (1936), and has followed it in cases such as South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07
(1987), Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 144 (1947), Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 640 (1937), and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586-87 (1937).
7. Cf The General Welfare Clause: The Hamiltonian and Madisonian Views, 22 A.B.A. J.
115, 115 (1936) (declaring that the Supreme Court has "[brought] a Long Historic Argument to an
End by the Explicit Adoption of the Hamiltonian View").
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II. PRIOR STUDIES OF THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE:
THE NEGLECT OF RATIFICATION
After the Supreme Court began to narrow the scope of the federal
commerce power in the 1990s,8 commentators began to examine anew
the issue of whether the Court ought to curtail the spending power as
well. For example, some commentators have urged the court to impose
more rigorously a requirement that expenditures be for "general," as
opposed to "local," welfare. 9 Others have argued that the General
Welfare Clause really does not include any spending power.'0 Still
others prefer to keep things as they are."
Such controversy would seem to justify an examination of the
original purpose and meaning of the Clause, for the Supreme Court is
usually attentive, if not deferential, to efforts to elucidate the "original
understanding"' 12 of constitutional language. 3  Yet the legal literature
contains no fully adequate effort to capture the original meaning or
purpose. Admittedly, some great minds have addressed the issue:
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Joseph Story, John Randolph
Tucker, and Charles Warren. However, Hamilton's interpretation is
suspect for reasons explored later in this Article, 14 and none of these
writers had available the extensive historical collections published over
the last few decades, including John Dickinson's convention notes,
which were published only twenty years ago. '5  Joseph Story wrote
8. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot
commandeer state executives); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress
can regulate states as states); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that
Congress cannot commandeer state legislatures).
9. E.g., Lawrence Claus, "Uniform Throughout the United States": Limits on Taxing as Limits
on Spending, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 517, 536-48 (2001); Eastman, supra note 2, at 65, 72.
10. E.g., Engdahl, supra note 2, at 216, 224-43; Renz, supra note 2, at 141-42.
11. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 92 (arguing that the spending power should be
protected because of the good outcomes it produces).
12. By "original understanding" I mean the common understanding, insofar as it is recoverable,
of the Constitution's ratifiers. For the relationship between original intent and original
understanding, and the legal primacy of the latter, see RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 8-9, 17-18.
13. See CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 1-7 (1969)
(discussing the role that history plays in Supreme Court opinions).
14. See infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
15. Since 1976 sixteen volumes of the DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, have been
published. In 1981, Herbert Storing issued the first good collection of Anti-Federalist writings. See
Storing, supra note 2. In 1983, John Dickinson's convention notes were published. See Hutson,
supra note 2.
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without even the benefit of that mainstay of constitutional scholarship:
Madison's comprehensive convention notes. 16
Moreover, all prior examinations, early and modem, 7  have
neglected the most important determinant of "original
understanding"18-the constitutional ratification process.19 Indeed, some
modem writers (including the writers of the brief that led the Supreme
Court to its current interpretation 20 ) have focused instead on events and
21usages arising years--even decades--after ratification. Yet the course
of public negotiation leading to ratification both clarified and shaped the
meaning22 of some of the Constitution's most important language,
including the General Welfare Clause.
Ratification of the Constitution was a very public political deal.23 Its
roots extended deep into Anglo-American history, but for the General
Welfare Clause the critical stages began in 1786, when Virginia called a
meeting to consider granting Congress the power to regulate trade. This
meeting, the Annapolis Convention, which was chaired by John
Dickinson,24 called on Congress and the states to authorize what became
the national constitutional convention. The convention met in May, and
through mid-September deliberated until the delegates had prepared a
draft acceptable to a majority of them. The convention then transmitted
16. Patterson, supra note 2, at 63, and WARREN, supra note 2, at 479, both imply that Story's
interpretation of the General Welfare Clause may have been different if he had seen Madison's
account of the convention.
17. E.g., BERGER, supra note 2, at 66-76; Engdahl, supra note 2; Soifer, supra note 2. The
most historically thorough of the modem writers is Renz, supra note 2, who takes full account of
history leading up to the drafting, but does not discuss the ratification process in detail.
18. On the legal primacy of ratification, see RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 8-9, 17-18.
19. See, e.g., 1 STORY, supra note 2, at 661-81 (focusing on the text, with some reference, at
679-81, to the official journal of the national constitutional convention); WARREN, supra note 2, at
464-79 (focusing on the national convention); Engdahl, supra note 2 (focusing on the proceedings
of the continental congress and the national constitutional convention).
20. The briefs for both parties in Butler v. United States are extracted in The General Welfare
Clause, supra note 7.
21. E.g., Corwin, supra note 2 (relying almost exclusively on occurrences after ratification,
some more than a century after ratification); Herman J. Herbert, Jr., The General Welfare Clauses in
the Constitution of the United States, 7 FORDHAM L. REv. 390 (1938) (same).
22. One commentator has explained that
the original commentary of 1787-88 arguably possesses a unique authority that later
interpretations can never equal .... In this view, the ratifiers were not interpreting the
Constitution merely to decide whether it would take effect; they were also investing their
notions of its meaning in the document itself, thereby obliging later interpreters to treat
those understandings as binding sources of authority.
RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 14.
23. See Robert G. Natelson, A Reminder: The Constitutional Values of Sympathy and
Independence, 91 Ky. L.J. 353, 354-56 (2003) (discussing the constitutional bargain).
24. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 238.
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it to Congress for further distribution to the states. This text was
essentially an offer from the convention to the general public.
What followed next was widespread public debate both in and
outside of the state ratifying conventions.25 Much of this debate
consisted "of highly problematic predictions of the consequences of
particular decisions." In other words, both proponents of the
Constitution (the "Federalists") and opponents (the "Anti-Federalists")
tried to convince the public of the ad horrorem consequences of adopting
the other side's logic. Although conventions in every state eventually
ratified the document-in other words, accepted the offer-most states
did so in a manner that was conditional de facto if not de jure.
The first way in which ratification was conditional was that the
ratifiers relied on the Federalists' representations as to the meaning of
some particularly controversial clauses. Mostly, this reliance was
informal (although clear), but it was sometimes formal. For example, the
New York ratifying convention approved the Constitution while
reiterating expressly the Federalist representation that "the prohibition
contained in the said Constitution against ex post facto laws, extend[ed]
only to laws concerning crimes., 27 This was one way to provide the
public with security against the Anti-Federalists' ad horrorem
constitutional predictions.
The second de facto condition on ratification was that the
Constitution would be speedily amended to clarify the limits on federal
power and add a bill of rights. During the years 1789 through 1791 the
Federalists assented to this condition and helped to ratify the first ten
amendments (which were, of course, drafted and pushed through
Congress by James Madison, a leading Federalist). These amendments
provided further security against the dreadful consequences of
ratification that Anti-Federalists had feared.
A by-product of this public political bargain was an outpouring of
notes, transcripts, letters, newspapers, pamphlets, broadsides, and
recorded orations. Through this historical record, we can hear Anti-
Federalists arguing that this or that part of the proposed frame of
government had such-and-such a meaning. We can hear their Federalist
adversaries agreeing with the Anti-Federalist interpretations in some
cases, and advancing their own in others. We can hear Federalists
25. See RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 17 ("Our reconstruction of the original understanding(s) of
the Constitution, then, cannot be divorced from the political context of the ratification struggle.").
26. Id. at 6.
27. 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 300; 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 194 (U.S. Dep't of State, 1894).
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
representing to the ratifying public what particular clauses mean, and
urging ratification on that basis. We hear Anti-Federalists insist on, and
Federalists finally agree to, subsequent amendments. Obviously,
knowledge of this historical record is crucial for reconstructing the
original understanding of the General Welfare Clause.
1I. LEADING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
Commentators have offered three principal interpretations of the
phrase, "to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States. 28 The first, which I shall call the
plenary view (or plenary interpretation), is that the phrase grants
Congress an independent power to regulate and spend for the common
defense and general welfare.29 Under this interpretation, the authority of
the federal government is limited only by the express exceptions set forth
in the Constitution, such as those contained in Article I, Section 930 and
in the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights.3'
Alexander Hamilton first suggested the second interpretation in
321791. Joseph Story accepted it in his Commentaries on the
Constitution,33 defending it principally by textual rather than historical
analysis.34 The Supreme Court adopted it by way of dictum in 1936,
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
29. Professor Renz calls this the "strong Hamiltonian view," because at the national
convention, Hamilton advocated a national government of plenary powers. Renz, supra note 2, at
103; see also 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 291 (setting forth Hamilton's plan for a
legislature with plenary powers). However, Hamilton also acknowledged that the final document
was very different from what he had sought. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 645-46
("No man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his own were known to be .. "). I have
avoided associating Hamilton's name with this interpretation because Hamilton never maintained
explicitly that the Constitution as ratified granted plenary powers.
30. Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution contains a variety of limitations, including
restrictions on the ability of Congress (and presumably other branches of the federal government) to
prohibit or tax the slave trade, suspend the writ of habeas corpus, grant titles of nobility, adopt ex
post facto laws, and so forth.
31. U.S. CONST. amends. I-VIlI.
32. Found in Story's Report on Manufactures. The relevant language is reprinted in 2 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, art. I, § 8, cl. 1, doc. 21.
33. STORY, supra note 2.
34. Id. at 329-54. The relevant language is reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra
note 2, art. I, § 8, cl. 1, doc. 28.
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without much detailed examination, in United States v. Butler.35  The
Court has followed the Hamilton-Story view ever since.
36
Under the Hamilton-Story view, the General Welfare Clause does
not grant authority to regulate37 but does grant authority to appropriate
and spend. This spending authority is independent of the other powers
enumerated in Article I, Section 8, and is not limited by their scope. If
there is a limitation,38 it is that money must be used to pay national debts
or fund programs that serve "the common Defence" or the "general
Welfare" rather than some local or special welfare. 39 However, it is
Congress, not the courts, that is the principal judge of whether the
common defense-general welfare standard is met.40 The real-life result
of this interpretation is that Congress can, and does, spend money on
pretty much whatever it wants.
The third principal interpretation of the General Welfare Clause is
41that it grants no power at all. This was James Madison's interpretation.
35. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Discussion of the General Welfare Clause in the briefs filed in Butler is
excerpted in The General Welfare Clause, supra note 7.
36. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S.
127 (1947); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619 (1937).
37. Engdahl, supra note 2, at 257, refers to regulatory powers as "governance" powers.
38. The Supreme Court has stated that this power may be limited as to federal grants to states if
conditions, on the grant are coercive, Dole, 483 U.S. at 211, but thus far no court has found
conditions to be sufficiently coercive to check the power.
39. See, e.g., Butler, 297 U.S. at 67 (noting Story's position that "if the tax be not proposed for
the common defense or general welfare, but for other objects wholly extraneous, it would be wholly
indispensable upon constitutional principles"); I STORY, supra note 2, at 673.
40. Butler, 297 U.S. at 67.
41. Renz, supra note 2, at 118-19. In his thoughtful and useful article, Professor Jeffrey Renz
attributes another view to Madison-that the language in question granted spending authority to
discharge the enumerated powers. Id. I cannot find the basis for this conclusion. On the contrary,
Madison seems to have interpreted Article I, Section 8, Clause I as a taxing power alone. See, e.g.,
THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 2, at 263 (summarizing the clause as stating "to raise money for
the general welfare"). Cf. James Madison, The Bank Bill, House of Representatives, 2 Feb. 1791,
reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, art. I, § 8, cl. 1, doc. 20 ("The bill did not
come within the first power. It laid no tax to pay the debts, or provide for the general welfare. It
laid no tax whatever. It was altogether foreign to the subject. No argument could be drawn from the
terms 'common defence, and general welfare.' The power as to these general purposes, was limited
to acts laying taxes for them.").
Professor Renz's conclusion apparently comes from Madison's 1800 Report on the Virginia
Resolutions, which he says best represents Madison's position. Renz, supra note 2, at 117. The
passage cited includes this language:
[Tihe Congress is authorized to provide money for the common defence and general
welfare. In both, is subjoined to this authority an enumeration of the cases to which their
powers shall extend. Money cannot be applied to the general welfare, otherwise than by
an application of it to some particular measure conducive to the general welfare.
Whenever, therefore, money has been raised by the general authority, and is to be applied
to a particular measure, a question arises whether the particular measure be within the
enumerated authorities vested in Congress.
KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
Madison maintained that the General Welfare Clause meant that tax
42money could be spent only pursuant to the other enumerated powers.
As Story phrased it, Madison saw the General Welfare Clause as a
"finger-board" pointing to the succeeding powers.43 Other writers, while
agreeing with Madison that the Clause grants no power, have suggested
that it does act to restrict the taxing power.44  I shall refer to any
conclusion that the General Welfare Clause does not grant spending or
regulatory authority as a Madisonian view.45
In the succeeding pages I shall first examine all three positions from
a textual standpoint. After that, I shall examine the history behind the
General Welfare Clause.
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 357 (emphasis in original).
Thus, in Madison's view, the junction of two powers is necessary for Congress to spend: it
may raise the money through the first clause of Article I, Section 8, but the spending is authorized by
a following clause. See also James Madison to Andrew Stevenson, Nov. 27, 1830, reprinted in THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, art. L § 8, cl. 1, doc. 27 ("An express power to raise
money, and an express power (for example) to raise an army, would surely imply a power to use the
money for that purpose. And if a doubt could possibly arise as to the implication, it would be
completely removed by the express power to pass all laws necessary and proper in such cases.").
What may have misled Professor Renz into concluding that Madison believed the Taxation
Clause contained a spending power was the phrase "to provide for," which appears both in the
General Welfare Clause and in the Virginia Resolutions. In twenty-first century English, "provide"
often means the same as "apply" or "spend." However, in eighteenth century English "provide"
usually and "to provide for" invariably means to build up a store for future use. Infra notes 72-84
and accompanying text.
Such quibbling aside, I should note that Professor Renz's actual conclusion on the scope of the
General Welfare Clause is more Madisonian than anything else, and not too far from the original
understanding, as shown in this Article.
42. See, e.g., James Madison, The Bank Bill, House of Representatives 2 Feb. 1791, reprinted
in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, art. I, § 8, cl. 1, doc. 20 ("The bill did not come
within the first power. It laid no tax to pay the debts, or provide for the general welfare. It laid no
tax whatever. It was altogether foreign to the subject. No argument could be drawn from the terms
'common defence, and general welfare.' The power as to these general purposes, was limited to acts
laying taxes for them; and the general purposes themselves were limited and explained by the
particular enumeration subjoined.").
43. 1 STORY, supra note 2, at 670-71.
44. Renz, supra note 2, at 144.
45. For other statements of Madisonian views, see WARREN, supra note 2, at 464-79; Engdahl,
supra note 2, at 218; Patterson, supra note 2, at 48-57.
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IV. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
A. Textual Analysis of the Plenary View
The plenary view is widely acknowledged to be textually
problematic, and thus has been widely rejected.46  There are three
fundamental difficulties. The first is that the effect of interpreting the
General Welfare Clause as a grant of plenary power to legislate for the
common defense and general welfare would be to render as surplus
Congress's remaining powers, both inside and outside of Article I. 4 7 For
example, if the General Welfare Clause includes the power to regulate
commerce, there is no need for a separate commerce power. If the
phrase includes the power to establish rules for the naturalization of
citizens, then there is no role for a separate naturalization clause. Taken
as a whole, the resulting surplusage would amount to over 380 words in
Article I, Section 8 alone-that is, nearly ten percent of the unamended
document.
The second textual difficulty with the plenary view is that the textual
role of the Tenth Amendment48 is to reinforce limits on federal power.
49
The Tenth Amendment is a subsequent addition to the Constitution, so in
cases of irresolvable conflict it should, of course, receive constructional
preference over the General Welfare Clause in accordance with the
maxim, Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.5° Yet the plenary
view, if it does not render the Tenth Amendment entirely nugatory,
renders its scope improbably narrow.
The third textual difficulty is that a plenary interpretation of federal
powers runs contrary to the evident policy of the Ninth Amendment,
46. E.g., WARREN, supra note 2, at 476-77; Corwin, supra note 2, at 550-51; Eastman, supra
note 2, at 67 n.18; Patterson, supra note 2, at 66-67; Renz, supra note 2, at 106-08; cf. Engdahl,
supra note 2, at 233-34.
47. Congress has some powers outside of Article I, such as the power to fix the compensation
of the President. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
48. See id. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."). The
incongruity of treating the Tenth Amendment as something other than a statement of the limits on
enumerated powers is discussed in Soifer, supra note 2, at 822-23.
49. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 442. George Mason addressed this issue at
the Virginia ratifying convention:
That Congress should have power to provide for the general welfare of the Union, I grant.
But I wish a clause in the Constitution, with respect to all powers which are not granted,
that they are retained by the states. Otherwise, the power of providing for the general
welfare may be perverted to its destruction.
Id.
50. "Later laws overrule earlier ones to the contrary." The United States Supreme Court has
recognized the maxim. See, e.g., Hale v. Gaines, 63 U.S. 144, 149 (1859).
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which was to assuage Anti-Federalist concerns that under the unamended
Constitution the central government's powers might be construed as
plenary and subject to only limited exceptions-rather than enumerated
and tightly defined.51
For reasons such as these, the plenary view has not won many
supporters. Professor John C. Eastman is only the latest. scholar to
pronounce the plenary interpretation "manifestly erroneous. 52
B. Textual Analysis of the Hamilton-Story View
The Hamilton-Story interpretation-that the General Welfare Clause
does not include a power to regulate, but does include very broad
spending authority-also labors under serious textual defects. One of
these is the same as the plenary view's first textual defect: accepting it
makes several other constitutional clauses redundant. Several items in
the Article I, Section 8 enumeration are powers that rather clearly
anticipate congressional spending, especially when coupled with the
Necessary and Proper Clause.53 If the words "to provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare" give Congress power to spend money on
the common defense, there is no need for a separate clause authorizing
Congress to "support Armies, 54 "maintain a Navy,' 55 purchase "Forts,
Magazines, [and] Arsenals,', 56 or "punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas" 57-all of which Congress could do under
the General Welfare Clause.58 Similarly, if the General Welfare Clause
grants an independent, largely unqualified domestic spending power,
then there is no need for separate grants of spending authority to
"establish Post Offices and Post Roads, 59 "constitute Tribunals inferior
51. Opinion on the scope of the Ninth Amendment is sharply divided, but practically all writers
agree that whatever else it may do, it certainly serves as a rule of construction against the conclusion
that federal power covers the entire field outside the exceptions in the Bill of Rights. For a
collection of views, see THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF
THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989). See especially id. at 60 (Madison,
commenting on the danger that an enumeration of rights might suggest that others are not retained).
52. Eastman, supra note 2, at 67 n.18.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
54. Id. cl. 12.
55. Id. cl. 13.
56. Id. cl. 17.
57. Id. cl. 10.
58. Obviously, even the regulatory powers, such as governing commerce, require the
expenditure of money as well, although generally much less. The Necessary and Proper Clause
eliminates any doubts that Congress may spend money to effectuate other powers. Id. cl. 18.
59. Id. cl. 7.
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to the supreme Court, or purchase "dock-Yards, and other needful
Buildings."'6' 16 light of this result, it is odd that Justice Story's principal
objection to the Madison view was that it resulted in surplus.62 His own
interpretation resulted in much greater surplus.
In addition to converting into surplus many of Congress's powers in
Article I; Section 8, the Hamilton-Story view also renders nugatory
certain limitations on congressional power set forth in the same section.
The structure of Article I, Section 8 is first to list a power and then add
any limitations on the power. The enumerated power "To raise and
support Armies" is qualified immediately by the rule that "no
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years. ' 6  If the General Welfare Clause contains independent authority
to spend "for the common Defence and general Welfare," then Congress
may avoid the time limit in the Military Appropriation Clause by relying
on the General Welfare Clause.
Congress has not tried to use the General Welfare Clause to bypass
the time limit on military appropriations, but it has acted in that manner
respecting another enumerated power. The Constitution grants Congress
authority "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," but
only by "securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 65
However, Congress has used its spending power under the prevailing
Hamilton-Story view to promote science and the useful arts in other
66
ways, such as through direct grants.
Another example of an enumerated power subject to express
limitation is the following. The italicized words are the words of
limitation:
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State
60. Id. cl. 9.
61. Id. cl. 17.
62. 1 STORY, supra note 2, at 670-71, 676.
63. Renz, supra note 2, at 127-28.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
65. Id. cl. 8.
66. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3707 (2003) (requiring the National Science Foundation provide
assistance to Cooperative Research Centers for technological innovation).
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in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.67
The Hamilton-Story view does not erase the limitation of the capital
district to "ten Miles square," as the plenary interpretation would do. It
does, however, render nugatory the limitation that Congress spend
money only for land "purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the
State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings."
Professor David E. Engdahl has identified yet another textual
problem with the Hamilton-Story view: if the General Welfare Clause is
a spending authorization, it is a curiously incomplete one. It permits
Congress to spend tax revenue, but not revenue from other sources-
fines, penalties, tolls and other user fees, leases, surplus property sales,
68gifts, bequests, and returns on investments.
In addition, construing the General Welfare Clause as a spending
power imports into the Constitution a stylistic awkwardness very
uncharacteristic of that elegantly-drawn document. Under that reading,
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 grants an authority to tax, then grants an
authority to spend, then doubles back to restrict the authority to tax. 6 9 No
other enumerated power is structured that way. Nor is any other
enumerated power granted by a subordinate clause. Most of the
enumerated items in Article I, Section 8 contain only one independent
clause (although a few contain two, connected by coordinating
conjunctions). Each independent clause grants a power,'7 but the
invariable role of subordinate clauses is to restrict or qualify powers
rather than grant them.7' That is why all grants of power (other than
those in added independent clauses) are introduced by the capitalized
word, "To." The General Welfare Clause, on the other hand, begins with
a small letter.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added).
68. Engdahl, supra note 2, at 222.
69. The restrictive portion reads as follows: "but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States." 1 JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 222 (Henry St. George Tucker ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1899).
70. Several of the powers divided by semi-colons contain two independent clauses, each
granting a separate power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 ("to declare War... and make Rules");
id. cl. 17 ("To exercise ... and to exercise"). One might place Clause 13 ("To provide and maintain
a Navy") in this category.
71. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States"), id. cl. 8 ("by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"), id. cl. 12 ("but no Appropriation of Money to
that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years"), id. cl. 16 ("reserving to the States respectively,
the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia").
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Those.are only some of the textual difficulties involved in construing
"to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare" as an affirmative grant of power.
Yet there is still another difficulty, this one understood only through
knowing the subtle, but interpretatively critical, differences between
modem and eighteenth-century English: one might argue that the verb
"to pay" suggests an immediate power of payment-hence, a spending
power. However, the Clause states that taxes will be levied "to pay the
Debts" but "to provide for" (not "pay for") the common defense and
general welfare. The significance of the change of verbs seems to have
been lost on courts and commentators unfamiliar with the founding
generation's Latinate English.72
Today, we usually employ the verb "provide" to mean "to give," as
in "she provided him with cash." That was not the usual way the term
was used in the eighteenth century. Then, the term usually had the
aspect of futurity in it suggested by its Latin forbear, providere, meaning
to look ahead or predict-and still captured in the modem English term
"provision," as in "he is making provision for the future." In Samuel
Johnson's Dictionary of 1755, the first definition of "to provide" is "[t]o
procure beforehand; to get ready; to prepare. 7 3  Although something
74closer to the modem usage appears in a secondary meaning, this was
notably not true of the specific phrase employed in the Constitution-"to
provide for." That meaning was always one of making provision for the
future, as "[t]o take care of beforehand ' 75 or "to provide for the coming
winter.'' 16 The difference between "provide for" and "pay" is the same
72. See GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
93 (1978) (discussing the Framers' use of words based on their Latin roots); MCDONALD, supra note
2, passim. See also CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS 2 (1994) (highlighting
the Framers' classical educations).
After several years in this business, I have come to believe that unfamiliarity with the Greek and
Roman classics is a serious obstacle to competent constitutional interpretation, and unfamiliarity
with the Latin language is almost an insuperable one. To illustrate the point, I sometimes ask my
students the meaning of the phrase in the Preamble, "a more perfect Union." Those with no Latin
invariably answer, "a better union." The answer is "a more complete union." In the eighteenth
century, outside the religious context, the word "perfect" almost always meant "complete,"
JOHNSON, supra note 2, following the Latin verb perficere, to finish or complete.
73. JOHNSON, supra note 2. 0
74. Id. (giving a secondary definition of "provide" as "[t]o furnish; to supply").
75. Id.
76. Another illustration of the distinction between providing and paying was found in the
wording of the Townshend Duties, whose language was popularized in America by John Dickinson:
"Whereas it is just and necessary ... that a revenue should be raised... for making a more certain
and adequate provision for defraying the charge . . .and the support . .. and towards further
defraying the expenses .. " DICKINSON, supra note 2, at 10, 56.
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as that employed by John Dickinson in distinguishing between "levying"
money and "applying" it.77
Whenever the verb "to provide '7 8 appears in the Constitution, it
embodies an element of futurity inconsistent with immediate spending or
appropriation. We have seen that in the Taxation Clause (of which,
recall, the General Welfare Clause is a part) the word "provide" appears
in contradistinction to "pay." The verb "pay" was used, not for future
debts arising under the Constitution, but for debts already incurred by the
Confederation.79 In another enumerated power, Congress is given
authority "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy. 8 °  First comes the
provision, next comes the maintenance. Similarly, Congress is "[tlo
provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current
Coin of the United States."8' Congress must adopt the relevant statutes
in advance; Congress does not do the actual punishing, which is the
prerogative of the executive and judicial branches. Yet again: Congress
is "[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia"S2-not actually call it forth,
which apparently is the prerogative of the President. Other examples
occur both in the Constitution8 3 and in the Articles of Confederation. 4
77. Id. at 52. Dickinson noted that in England, only Parliament could levy money, while the
Crown had authority to apply it. Id. Indeed, the phrase "to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare" was but a replacement for Roger Sherman's earlier wording,
"for the payment of said debts and for the defraying the expences that shall be incurred for the
common defence and general welfare." WARREN, supra note 2, at 472-73 (emphasis added).
Sherman's motion, which appears at 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 408, was defeated,
only to be resurrected by Judge David Brearley's "Committee of Eleven." It was, says Warren, "the
very change proposed by Sherman on August 25, but rejected by the Convention as unnecessary."
WARREN, supra note 2, at 473.
78. I am excluding here as inapplicable the Constitution's use of "provided" in the sense of a
legal proviso. See U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2 ("[the President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur").
79. WARREN, supra note 2, at 473.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
81. Id. cl. 6.
82. Id. cl. 15.
83. See id. cl. 16 ("To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the
States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress"-i.e., the actual work is to be done by the states
and executive power); id. art. I1, § 1, cl. 6 ("[C]ongress may by Law provide for the Case of
Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice President ... ").
84. See ART. CONFED. art. VI, cl. 4 ("shall provide and constantly have ready for use"-words
of contrasting future and present force).
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C. Textual Analysis of Madisonian Views
Under the various Madisonian views, the General Welfare Clause is
not a grant of power at all. Madison himself argued that the words
"common Defence and general Welfare" are no more than a reference to
the other enumerated powers the Constitution grants Congress.85 Justice
Joseph Story contended that this position left the phrase without meaning
-as surplusage:
Stripped of the ingenious texture by which this argument is disguised
[Story wrote], it is neither more nor less than an attempt to obliterate
from the Constitution the whole clause, "to pay the debts, and provide
for the common defence and general welfare of the United States," as
entirely senseless, or inexpressive of any intention whatsoever .... they
are to be deemed, vox et preterea nihil, an empty sound and vain
phraseology, a finger-board pointing to other powers, but having no use
whatsoever since these powers are sufficiently apparent without.86
Deferring to the constructional preference against surplus, Story felt
forced to conclude that the words granted an independent spending
power:
[I]f congress may lay taxes for the common defence and general
welfare, the money may be appropriated for those purposes, although
not within the scope of the other enumerated powers. Certainly, it may
be so appropriated; for if Congress is authorized to lay taxes for such
purposes, it would be strange, if, when raised, the money could not be
applied to them. That would be to give a power for a certain end, and
then deny the end intended by the power.
87
This is the view that, as noted earlier,88 the Supreme Court adopted in
United States v. Butler.
89
85. WARREN, supra note 2, at 474-75.
86. 1 STORY, supra note 2, at 670-71; see also id. at 676. Vox et preterea (classical Latin:
praeterea) nihil means "voice (or sound) and beyond that, nothing." Translations from Latin to
English in this Article are by the author, unless otherwise noted.
87. Id. at 673-74.
88. Supra notes 6, 20 and accompanying text.
89. 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936):
Congress is expressly empowered to lay taxes to provide for the general welfare. Funds
in the Treasury as a result of taxation may be expended only through appropriation. (Art.
1, § 9, cl. 7.) They can never accomplish the objects for which they were collected,
unless the power to appropriate is as broad as the power to tax. The necessary
implication from the terms of the grant is that the public funds may be appropriated "to
provide for the general welfare of the United States." These words cannot be
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Now it must first be said in response to Story's argument that the fact
that a particular interpretation leads to a small amount of surplus does not
"certainly" disqualify that interpretation. By their own admission, the
framers occasionally sprinkled surplus into the Constitution-"additional
fences," Madison once said in another context. 90 More importantly, if it
be presumed that in constitutional interpretation as in most kinds of legal
interpretation, less surplusage is better than more, then Story is subject
not only to a tu quoque response, but to a tu quoque maius response. For
as we have seen, the Hamilton-Story construction leads to much more
surplus than Madison's view does. Madison's surplus is merely a
subordinate clause; Story's surplus consists of several powers in the
Article I, Section 8 enumeration. 91
Yet one may avoid even a small amount of surplus by going beyond
Madison and construing the General Welfare Clause not as a
"fingerboard," but as a substantive limitation on the taxing power. This
construction is consistent with the organization of several other items in
Article I, Section 8: they begin with a grant, then follow (generally in a
subordinate clause) with a limitation on the grant.92 Even Justice Story,
although reading the General Welfare Clause as creating a spending
power, also viewed it as limiting the power just granted.93
If, however, the General Welfare Clause is a limitation on the taxing
power, then what sort of limitation is it? Is it a limitation on the
structure of taxes imposed or a limitation on the purposes for which
taxes may be imposed? It could be both.
If the clause is a restriction on the structure of taxes, then it may
disallow taxes imposed only on a particular locality or otherwise
unfairly. However, that protection is rendered largely unnecessary
meaningless, else they would not have been used. The conclusion must be that they were
intended to limit and define the granted power to raise and to expend money.
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 2, at 282 (referring to the Ex Post Facto Clauses,
Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 and Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution).
91. Professor Renz, in finding that the language in question is not a spending clause, concedes a
certain redundancy. Renz, supra note 2, at 142. As appears below, I do not believe that concession
is necessary.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (patents and copyrights), id. cl. 12 (military appropriations), id.
cl. 16 (militia); id. cl. 17 (limitation on federal property and purchases located in parenthesis and in
terminal phrase).
93. 1 STORY, supra note 2, at 673:
If the tax be not proposed for the common defence, or general welfare, but for other
objects, wholly extraneous (as, for instance, for propagating Mahometanism among the
Turks, or giving aids and subsidies to a foreign nation, to build palaces for its kings, or
erect monuments to its heroes), it would be wholly indefensible upon constitutional
principles. The power, then, is, under such circumstances, necessarily a qualified power.
For a modem view similar to Story's, see Corwin, supra note 2, at 551-52 (quoting Jefferson with
approval).
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because the Constitution has several explicit guards against
discriminatory taxation. Duties, imposts, and excises-the "indirect"
taxes-must be uniform throughout the United States.94  Direct taxes
must be allocated by population.95 No taxes can be levied on exports. 96
All ports of the United States must be treated equally.97 One might even
argue that construing the General Welfare Clause as a limitation on the
structure of taxes renders it a mere "fingerboard" pointing to the more
specific structural limitations-and may turn those structural limitations
into surplusage.
On the other hand, if the General Welfare Clause is a limitation on
the purposes for which taxes may be imposed, then it indirectly restricts
how tax revenue may be used. This avoids all surplusage objections. It
also fits with the pattern of the document: the initial independent clause
of the Taxation Clause empowers Congress to tax, leaving the focus of
the ensuing subordinate clause as limiting the purposes for which taxes
may be imposed; that is, tax money is to be employed only "to pay the
Debts and provide for [store up revenue for eventual appropriations for98]
the common Defence and general Welfare."99
Thus, textual analysis does not support either the plenary or the
Hamilton-Story view. It gives better support to Madison's view, at least
as characterized by Story, that the General Welfare Clause is a
"fingerboard" pointing to the ensuing powers. However, the best textual
interpretation is that the General Welfare Clause limits the purposes for
which taxes can be levied.
Next we turn to adoption history to see whether it corroborates or
conflicts with textual analysis, and if it corroborates textual analysis, to
determine the nature of the limitation imposed.
V. HISTORY PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
A history of the General Welfare Clause might fruitfully begin with
John Dickinson, because he was, in an important sense, its principal
94. U.S. CONST. art. L § 8, cl. 1.
95. Id. § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers."); id. § 9,
cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.").
96. Id. § 9, cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.").
97. Id. § 9, cl. 6 ("No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to
the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be
obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.").
98. Supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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drafter.'00 Dickinson farmed in Delaware, practiced law in Pennsylvania,
and was active in the public affairs of both of those partially-conjoined
colonies. He was a man with strong beliefs on the subject of government
revenue. Before the Revolution, he popularized his beliefs in his wildly
successful Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania.'0' In the "Letters"
(actually they were essays), Dickinson urged peaceful resistance to, and
repeal of, the Townshend Duties that Parliament had imposed on the
colonies.
Early in his Letters, Dickinson distinguished two different kinds of
financial exactions. "Taxes" were imposed to raise revenue.' 02 "Duties"
were for regulating trade. 10 3  Dickinson argued that the Townshend
Duties were really taxes because they were designed to raise revenue. 0 4
He argued that Parliament had no power to tax the colonies; that power
belonged exclusively to the colonial assemblies. 0 5 However, Dickinson
also contended that, legitimacy aside, the Townshend taxes violated the
salutary principle that the people charged with paying should be the same
people who benefited from expenditure of the money: °6 Qui sentit
commodum, sentire debet et onus,10 7 he wrote. Under the Townshend
exactions, however, the British authorities planned to use the revenue
gathered from the thirteen colonies to pay for expenses incurred
elsewhere (Florida, Nova Scotia, and Canada) and for expenses incurred
in the thirteen colonies that those colonies didn't need because they had
been providing those services themselves. 8
Dickinson conceded that Parliament had authority to impose duties
to regulate trade. He further conceded that those duties need not be
uniform. Parliament could employ them to restrain the trade of only one
100. For a longer narration of Dickinson's influence, see Renz, supra note 2, although my
conclusions differ in a few particulars.
101. The Farmer's letters were printed in 19 of the 23 American newspapers. FLOWER, supra
note 2, at 65. The title selected is interesting. Dickinson certainly was present "in Pennsylvania"
much of the time, and he was, among other things, a farmer. But his farms were in Delaware.
102. Dickinson, supra note 2, at 21.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 10.
105. Id. at 15.
106. Id. at 47-50.
107. "He who feels the benefit should feel also the burden." Dickinson translated it, 'They who
feel the benefit, ought to feel the burden." Id. at 50.
108. Id. at 47-50. See also id. at 66:
Let any person look into the late act of parliament, and he will immediately perceive, that
the immense estates of Lord Fairfax, Lord Baltimore, and our Proprietaries, which are
among his Majesty's other "DOMINIONS" to be "defended, protected and secured" by
the act, will not pay a single farthing for the duties thereby imposed, except [if] Lord
Fairfax wants some of his windows glazed [there was a duty on glass]; Lord Baltimore
and our Proprietaries are quite secure, as they live in England.
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part of the empire.109 But the goal had to be to further the "general
welfare" (his words) of the entire Empire. 0  Duties designed merely to
benefit a part of the empire were not defensible."' Also not defensible
were duties designed to create monopolies or otherwise assist merely
private parties.' 12
Whether financial exactions were revenue-raising taxes or trade-
regulating duties, Dickinson thought they should serve the "general
welfare," not local or private welfare. The measure of whether an
exaction served the general welfare was less the structure of the exaction
than its effects. 3
In preparing a charter for colonial union, Benjamin Franklin
anticipated Dickinson somewhat. On July 21, 1775, Franklin presented
to the Continental Congress proposed Articles of Confederation, Article
II of which provided that the colonies were to "severally enter into a firm
League of Friendship ... for their common Defence... the Safety of
their Persons and Families, and their ... mutual and general Welfare.""I 1
4
Article V specified that the general welfare included those items on
which the colonial assemblies "cannot be competent": commerce,
currency, posts, and defense."l 5 Article VI included a financial "General
Welfare Clause" limiting expenditures: "All Charges of Wars, and all
other general Expences to be incurr'd for the common Welfare, shall be
109. Dickinson, supra note 2, at 8.
110. Id. at 8; see also id. at 37 (stating that placing a duty only on exports from Great Britain
must be a tax, rather than a duty, because it only affects the colonies).
In the Preface to the 1801 edition of his works, Dickinson quoted with approval Lord
Chatham (William Pitt the Elder), who in 1774 had spoken on behalf of the colonies:
As an Englishman, I recognize to the Americans, their supreme unalterable right of
property. As an American, I would equally recognize to England, her supreme right of
regulating commerce and navigation. The distinction is involved in the abstract nature of
things; property is private, individual, absolute: the touch of another annihilates it. Trade
is an extended and complicated consideration; it reaches as far as ships can sail, or winds
can blow; it is a vast and various machine. To regulate the numberless movements of its
several parts, and combine them into one harmonious effect, for the good of the whole,
requires the superintending wisdom and energy of the supreme power of the empire.
John Dickinson, Preface to I POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2, at xvi.
111. John Dickinson, The Late Regulations Respecting The British Colonies on the Continent of
America Considered, in 1 POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 221-22.
112. John Dickinson, Two Letters on the Tea Tax, in 1 POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2, at
459-60.
113. Dickinson was not inattentive to structure. He believed that taxes should be proportioned
based on ability to pay. John Dickinson, The Late Regulations Respecting The British Colonies on
the Continent of America Considered, in I POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 230. But that
received little or no emphasis in his discussions of the general welfare criterion.
114. Journals of the Continental Congress: Franklin's Articles of Confederation; July 21, 1775,
art. I, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/contcong/07-
21-75.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
115. Id. art. V.
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defray'd out of a common Treasury." Still another general welfare
limitation appeared in Article XI: Purchases from the Indians were to be
only those that were "for the General Advantage and Benefit of the
United Colonies."" 6  Under Franklin's draft, local welfare was to be
furthered locally, for Article III specified that "each Colony shall enjoy
and retain as much as it may think fit of its own present Laws, Customs,
Rights, and Privileges, and peculiar Jurisdictions within its own Limits;
and may amend its own Constitution as shall seem best to its own
Assembly or Convention."'" 7  Franklin and Dickinson had been at
political loggerheads in the past, 18 but on this occasion all of Franklin's
language was very Dickinsonian.
After the Declaration of Independence, Congress authorized the
preparation of the actual Articles of Confederation. For this task
Congress turned to the "genuine article," so to speak. It entrusted the
chairmanship of the drafting committee to Dickinson, and the first draft
is in his handwriting." 9 This draft's statement of purpose provided that
"The said Colonies unite themselves ... for their common Defence, the
Security of their Liberties, and their mutual and general Welfare."' 20 The
document further authorized spending of money "for the common
Defence, or general Welfare"' 2' and required that purchases of Indian
lands 22 and dispositions of lands 23 be for the "general Benefit."' 24
Congress was to convene "for the more convenient Management of the
general Interests.' 2 5  Yet, each state would retain "sole and exclusive
Regulation and Government of its internal police [governance] , ' z6
116. Id. art. Vl.
117. Id. art. III (line-out in original).
118. They were on opposite sides of the debate over whether Pennsylvania should petition for
conversion from a proprietary to a crown colony. STILLP, supra note 2, at 41; FLOWER, supra note
2, at 37. Dickinson was much more conservative than the populist Franklin. Compare, e.g., 2
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 202, 207 (Dickinson favors property requirement for voting
for federal House of Representatives) with id. at 204-05, 208 (Franklin opposes such a requirement).
119. FLOWER, supra note 2, at 159.
120. Journals of the Continental Congress: Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union; July
12, 1776, art. 11, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweblavalonlcontcong07-12-76.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
121. Id. art. XI.
122. Id. art. XIV.
123. Id. art. XVIII.
124. Id.
125. Id. art. XVI.
126. Id. art. IIl. "Internal" governance was a term used by popular pre-Revolutionary authors,
including Dickinson, to cover certain powers said to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of colonial
assemblies rather than Parliament, including regulation of property, governance of the courts, and
taxation. See H. TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG HISTORY AND THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 180 (Uberty Fund, 1998) (1965); John
Dickinson, Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly of Pennsylvania Relative to the Stamp Act. in I
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agreeing to abide by the determinations of Congress made "for the
common Defence or general Welfare" while foreswearing the use of
force to resolve impositions by Congress on matters of local benefit.
27
The finished version of the Articles of Confederation followed much
the same pattern. There was a statement of intent: "The said States
hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other,
for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual
and general welfare ... ,,128 There was an enumeration of the powers of
Congress and a reservation of all other powers in the states. 129 Most
relevant for our purposes, the completed Articles, like their predecessors,
included a financial clause that made it clear that any spending had to be
on matters of general welfare. Article VI stated:
All charges of war, and all other expences that shall be incurred for the
common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States
in congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury,
which shall be supplied by the several states in proportion to the value
of all land within each state .... 130
Note that this article added no power to the others granted in the
instrument. It is explanatory and restrictive. 31 Note also that the future-
looking language applied to money-raising presaged the future-looking
"to provide for" language of the Constitution's General Welfare Clause.
VI. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
A. Proceedings at the Convention
The inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation as a governing
charter induced the delegates at the federal convention to look for other
models. The perils of extreme decentralization, coupled with the
understandable influence of British precedents, help explain why the first
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 173-77 (claiming for colonies taxation power and trial by
jury); John Dickinson, A Petition to the King from the Stamp Act Congress, in id. at 193-96
(claiming for the colonies "full power of legislation and trial by jury").
127. Journals of the Continental Congress, supra note 120, art. XII.
128. ART. CONFED. art. I.
129. The enumerated powers of the Confederation are located primarily in id. art. IX. The
Articles also cautioned that the states retained all powers not "expressly" delegated to Congress. Id.
art. II. On the nature of the Confederation as a government of limited capacity, see THE FEDERALIST
No. 41 (James Madison), supra note 2, at 264.
130. ART. CONFED. art. VIII.
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
instinct of convention leaders was to propose a "consolidated" rather
than a "federal" union.
This consolidationist vision was embodied in the Virginia Plan, so-
called because it was proposed by the Virginia delegation, led defacto
132
by Governor Edmund Randolph and by James Madison. In effect, the
Virginia Plan was a scheme in which the states would survive only as
"corporations," fulfilling the kind of subordinate roles that local
government played in England. 33  One delegate, Delaware's George
Read, proposed abolishing the states entirely. 1 4 Most of the delegates
believed, however, that the states should be preserved, if merely for
instrumental reasons: the general government simply could not "extend
its care to every requisite object" 135over such a large territory.
The Virginia Plan served as the basis of discussion during the first
few weeks of the convention. The Virginia Plan was premised on the
conclusion that the Articles were inadequate to "accomplish the objects
proposed by their institution; namely, 'common defence, security of
liberty and general welfare."", 136 By the terms of the scheme, the new
government would receive the cumulative total of powers (1) that
Congress had enjoyed under the Confederation, (2) in which "the
separate states are incompetent," and (3) necessary to "the harmony of
the United States."' 137 In addition, Congress would receive (4) a plenary
veto over state legislation.' 38 At this stage, proposals for a more limited
list of federal powers were dismissed as impractical. 139 When the New
Jersey delegation offered its own, more decentralized proposal on June
16, 1787 (the New Jersey Plan) the delegates rejected it by a decisive
vote. On the other hand, they quietly laid aside the proposal of
Alexander Hamilton, offered on June 18, which would have granted
Congress legislative authority without limit-"with power to pass all
laws whatsoever"-subject only to the executive veto. 14°  While not
going quite as far as Hamilton, the delegates at this point still appeared
132. Technically, the leader of the Virginia delegation was George Washington, but as President
of the Convention, his participation in the debates was limited.
133. Some Anti-Federalists later charged that the effect of the Constitution, unless amended,
would be to reduce the states to the level of "corporations." E.g., 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 277 (AMERICAN HERALD). See also 5 id. at 638 (AMERICAN HERALD discussing the effect
of the "High Court of the Union" on the states' sovereignty).
134. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 136.
135. Id. at 357 (James Madison).
136. Id. at 20; see also id. at 187 (referring to G. Morris's statements concerning the Articles'
goals of "Common Defence, Security of Liberty, mutual and general Welfare").
137. Id. at 21.
138. Id.
139. E.g., id. at 53 (James Madison); id. at 59-60 (Roger Sherman).
140. Id. at 291.
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willing to grant the new government even the power to interfere with the
"internal police" (internal governance) of states.141 Indeed, when Roger
Sherman proposed that the states retain exclusive jurisdiction over such
matters, Gouverneur Morris responded that in some cases they ought not
even have that.
142
Sherman introduced his proposal in the form of a motion to
enumerate the powers of the central government, with a proviso that
states should be able to legislate when "the General welfare of the United
States is not concerned."' 143  The convention rejected it,' 44 adopting
instead a resolution allowing Congress "to legislate in all cases for the
general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are
separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States
may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation."'
45
Yet the day the convention rejected Sherman's motion-July 17,
1787-marked the high tide of proposed centralization. He was only one
of several delegates contending that the states should not be mere
"corporations," but should be left with considerable authority. 46 Later
the same day they won their first battle when the convention voted to
abandon the congressional veto over state legislation and to replace it
with a general supremacy clause. On July 23, when the draft constitution
was submitted to the Committee of Detail, the new government was not
yet limited to enumerated powers, 147 but when the Committee submitted
its revision on August 1, the sweeping language of the Virginia Plan was
gone and a modest enumeration had replaced it.148 Efforts later in the
convention to add powers to the list were mostly unsuccessful.
149
141. For the accepted meaning of "internal" governance, see supra note 126.
142. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 26.
143. Id. at 25-26.
144. Id. at 21, 26.
145. Id. at 21.
146. E.g., id. at 86 (John Dickinson). See also id. at 133 (Roger Sherman stating that criminal
and civil jurisdiction should be left with the states); id. at 160 (George Mason stating that the Senate
should be appointed by state legislatures); id. at 165 (Hugh Williamson averring that states ought to
control their "internal police"); id. (Elbridge Gerry opining that control of the militia ought to be a
state power).
147. Id. at 131-32.
148. Id. at 157-59. One writer has argued that the change arose from the personal beliefs of the
members of the Committee of Detail-beliefs not typical of the convention, but which the
convention accepted because of the press of time. John C. Hueston, Note, Altering the Course of the
Constitutional Convention: The Role of the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State
and Federal Powers, 100 YALE L.J. 765, 779-82 (1990). While not ruling out that possibility, noted
historian Jack N. Rakove suggests the convention may have viewed the sweeping "federal powers"
language in the Virginia Plan as a place-holder for a subsequent, more detailed enumeration.
RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 177-78. His views have some support from comments made at the
convention. See, e.g., I CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 53 (Edmund Randolph,
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Meanwhile, the process had begun of tacking general welfare
language onto the new government's financial powers. On August 6, the
Committee of Detail presented to the convention a draft constitution
embodying the delegates' agreements thus far. 50  The draft did not
include a general welfare qualification on federal tax authority, so
Dickinson added the following words on his copy: "no Preference or
Advantage to be given to any persons or places-Laws to be equal."' 151
Soon thereafter, Dickinson was placed on a Committee of Eleven chaired
by William Livingston to deal further with financial issues.152 On
August 21, that committee proposed a general welfare qualification to
the payment of debts. 153  On August 25, Roger Sherman offered a
proposal to connect the previously-granted power to pay Confederation
debts with the Taxation Clause, qualifying them both with general
welfare language. Madison reported:
Mr. Sherman thought it necessary to connect with the clause for
laying taxes duties &c [sic] an express provision for the object of the
old debts &c-and moved to add to the 1 st. clause of 1 st. sect-of art
VII "for the payment of said debts and for the defraying the expences
that shall be incurred for the common defence and general welfare"
The proposition, as being unnecessary was disagreed to,
Connecticut alone, being in the affirmative. 1
54
However, just as Roger Sherman initially lost on enumerating federal
powers only to win via committee, here he also recovered to win via
committee. On September 4, a Committee of Eleven, headed by Judge
David Brearley-and also numbering among its members John
Dickinson 155 - recommended insertion in the Taxation Clause the phrase
"to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general
welfare." 56  Historian Charles Warren argues that this was but a
disclaiming any intention for indefinite federal powers). Whatever the reason, the change was
fortunate, for the participating public would have never ratified the sweeping language of the
Virginia Plan.
149. For example, the convention defeated on August 25 (by a 10-1 margin) Edmund
Randolph's motion to provide "for the payment of said debts and for the defraying the expences that
shall be incurred for the common defence and general welfare." 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 2, at 408 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 177-89.
151. Hutson, supra note 2, at 281.
152. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 327-28, 352.
153. Id. at 352.
154. Id. at 414.
155. Id. at473, 493.
156. Id. at 493.
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replacement for Sherman's earlier wording, "for the payment of said
debts and for the defraying the expences that shall be incurred for the
common defence and general welfare."'' 5 7  Again, we see the future-
orientation of the reference to spending. A more recent historian, Forrest
McDonald, contends that "[t]he phraseology . . . was understood as
prohibiting the expenditure of money for such 'internal improvements'
as roads and canals, since those must, of necessity, promote the particular
welfare of specific states rather than the 'general' welfare."' 58 Both of
these seem consistent with Dickinson's apparent reason for the Clause:
that "no Preference or Advantage to be given to any persons or
places."1
59
Thus, the Taxation Clause now read, "[t]he Legislature shall have
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the
debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States."' 160  A Committee of Style and Arrangement chaired by
Gouverneur Morris later added a requirement that indirect taxes be
uniform.' 6 ' Finally, on September 12 and 13, Dickinson cooperated with
George Mason to insert in the Constitution a Congressional power to
revise state inspection duties. 162  The idea was to prevent states with
ports from oppressing those without' 63 --consistent with Dickinson's
consistently-stated view.164
Regarding Gouverneur Morris, a stubborn tradition has it that he
thought that the General Welfare Clause was a separate and copious
fount of legislative power. The basis for this tradition rests on the
convention notes of James McHenry for September 6:
Spoke to Gov Morris Fitzimmons and Mr Goram to insert a power in
the confederation enabling the legislature to erect piers for protection of
shipping in winter and to preserve the navigation of harbours-Mr
157. WARREN, supra note 2, at 472-73 (emphasis added). It was, says Warren, "the very change
proposed by Sherman on August 25, but rejected by the Convention as unnecessary." Id. at 473.
158. MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 264-65.
159. Hutson, supra note 2, at 281.
160. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 493.
161. The September 12 report of the Committee of Style and Arrangement added the final
clause. As of that day, the clause read:
Sect. 8. The Congress may by joint ballot appoint a treasurer. They shall have power.
<(a)> To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the debts and provide
for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. <but all duties imposts
& excises shall be uniform throughout the U. States.>
Id. at 594 (citations omitted).
162. Id. at 589, 607.
163. Id. at 589.
164. Supra notes 110, 151 and accompanying text.
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Gohram against. The other two gentlemen for it-Mr Gov: thinks it
may be done under the words of the I clause I sect 7 art. amended-
"and provide for the common defence and general welfare.["]-If this
comprehends such a power, it goes to authorise the legisl. to grant
exclusive privileges to trading companies etc.165
McHenry apparently understood Morris's point to be that the
General Welfare Clause was plenary in nature because it could serve as a
source of authority to erect piers and therefore create monopolies.
166
McHenry was likely confused. He tells us that Morris and Thomas
Fitzsimmons were in favor of "insert[ing] a power . . . enabling the
legislature to erect piers."' 167 If Morris was in favor of inserting such a
power, he could not have thought the General Welfare Clause broad
enough to include it. Morris' suggestion that "it may be done under the
words... 'and provide for the common defence and general welfare
'
"
168
may mean only that the insertion could be placed in the part of the
enumeration that follows (i.e., is physically "under") the Taxation
Clause. 1
69
Gouverneur Morris plays the villain in another doubtful story. This
is the tale that, as chairman of the Committee of Style and Arrangement
he surreptitiously tried to create an independent general welfare power
by setting off the General Welfare Clause from the language immediately
preceding with a semicolon rather than a comma. The tale was told more
than a decade later by Albert Gallatin on the floor of Congress.
70
This story also seems unlikely, and Gallatin could not have known
the truth personally since he wasn't at the convention. The story
assumes that Morris thought he was playing with fools, easily
hoodwinked-at the Philadelphia convention, the "assembly of
demigods!,'171 Of course, any sleight of hand was likely to be caught,
and this error was indeed caught. The convention's decision to remove
the semicolon corroborates the conclusion that the General Welfare
Clause was not an independent power. 172
165. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 529-30.
166. MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 265.
167. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 529-30.
168. Id.
169. Engdahl, supra note 2, at 252, also doubts McHenry's interpretation, although on different
grounds.
170. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 379; McDONALD, supra note 2, at 265 n.8.
171. Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug. 30, 1787), in 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
2, at 76.
172. Id. at 379.
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B. Implications of History through the National Convention
The final draft of the Constitution reported to Congress contemplated
a far weaker central government than had been envisioned in the Virginia
Plan. Indeed, one could argue that the final proposal was at least as
similar to the Articles of Confederation as to the Virginia Plan. At the
South Carolina legislative session that called the South Carolina ratifying
convention, Edward Rutledge pointed out that federal powers under the
new Constitution were basically similar to those under the Articles of
Confederation. The major difference, he said, was that the government
under the Constitution would have the power to enforce its decrees.' 73
What is striking about the phrase "general welfare," however, is that
it ran as a constant theme through shifting plans of government for over
twelve years. It appeared (1) in Benjamin Franklin's proposed articles of
confederation of 1775, (2) in John Dickinson's first draft of the
eventually-adopted Articles, (3) in the Articles themselves (and
therefore, by reference, in the New Jersey Plan to strengthen the
Articles174), (4) in the centralized Virginia Plan, (5) in Roger Sherman's
proposal for a government less powerful than that contemplated by the
Virginia Plan, (6) in proposals to have the federal government pay
confederation debts, and (7) in the finished Constitution. The phrase
seems to have been shorthand for "the benefit of the interests we have in
common rather than the benefit of particular localities or parties." In
other words, each of these proposals left some powers to the states, and
the "common Defence and general Welfare" language was designed to
define the outer limits of federal power. Thus, it was essentially not a
phrase of power, but of limitation. 175
It may be significant that Alexander Hamilton's proposed frame of
government-the only proposal to grant Congress plenary authority--did
not include "general welfare" language. 176 The reason is simple: words
173. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 299, available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.htm. For other observations of the similarities between
the documents, see 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 245-46 (article appearing in the
Cumberland Gazette, Nov. 15, 1787); 5 id. at 567 (letter from Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant); RAKOVE,
supra note 2, at 177, 178-79 (citing Madison's FEDERALIST No. 45).
174. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 242-45.
175. This is underscored by the decisive rejection of Edmund Randolph's August 25 motion to
bestow on Congress authority to tax "'for the payment of said debts and for the defraying the
expences that shall be incurred for the common defence and general welfare,"' which by setting off
"expences ... for the common defence and general welfare" might have looked something like a
source of independent power. 2 id. at 408 (emphasis added).
176. 1 id. at 291-93. Around the time the federal convention ended, Hamilton presented to
Madison a plan more polished than that he had presented during the convention, which he said
reflected the constitution he would have liked to have seen. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at
KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
of limitation did not belong in a proposal that would empower Congress
to "pass all laws whatsoever." 177  Hamilton wanted the national
legislature to have power to legislate on matters of local and private as
well as general welfare.
VII. THE COURSE OF THE RATIHCATION DEBATE: THE GENERAL
WELFARE CLAUSE AS A "NON-POWER"
A. The Significance of the Debate
I am far from the first to conclude that the national convention
delegates did not intend the General Welfare Clause to be an independent
grant of power. 178 However, the relevant inquiry here is not into original
intent but into original meaning or understanding. More important than
what the national delegates thought in secret 179 was what the ratifying
public was led to believe it was agreeing to.' 80 The principle is well
understood in contract law: if the subjective, hidden intent of an offeror
is not reflected in the offer and is different from the understanding of the
offeree, then generally it is not part of the ensuing contract.1
81
B. Early Anti-Federalist Attacks
The Taxation Clause was prominent in the public debate over the
proposed Constitution. The more extreme Anti-Federalists, such as
Patrick Henry of Virginia, apparently didn't think that Congress should
584. Article VII, Section 1 of that plan does include general welfare language, but specifies that the
legislature shall be the judge of the general welfare-a prescription for nearly plenary power. Id. at
588 ("The legislature of the United States shall have power to pass all laws which they shall judge
necessary to the common defence and general welfare of the union."). The paper includes some
specific limitations on the legislative power apparently taken from the convention's final draft, such
as bans on ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, titles of nobility, and state-by-state apportionment of
real estate and capitation taxes. Id.
177. Id. at 291.
178. See, e.g., WARREN, supra note 2, at 475; Engdahl, supra note 2, at 237; Patterson, supra
note 2, at 48; Renz, supra note 2, at 129.
179. See WARREN, supra note 2, at 479 (implying that Story's erroneous interpretation of the
Taxation Clause may have arisen in part because Madison's account of the convention was not yet
available); Patterson, supra note 2, at 63 (same). Cf. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND
THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 9 (1988) (stating, with respect to Hamilton's interpretation of the
General Welfare Clause, "[iun effect, Hamilton capitalized on the fact that Madison's Notes had not
been published").
180. On the distinctions between original intent and original understanding, and the legal
primacy of the latter, see RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 8-9, 17-18.
181. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 114 (1982) (stating that the objective theory of
contracts generally prevails).
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have the power to tax at all. 182 However, the moderate Anti-Federalists
who comprised a majority of the Constitution's public critics do not
seem to have shared Henry's views in that regard. Most outspoken Anti-
Federalists conceded that Congress needed the capacity to tax. They just
thought the scope of that capacity should be narrower. 183
That the power granted by the Taxation Clause was too wide was a
common theme of early Anti-Federalist attacks on the Constitution.
Note that these Anti-Federalists weren't necessarily saying (as some
Anti-Federalists later said) that the Taxation Clause would grant
Congress separate spending or regulatory powers. They were saying that
the Constitution granted Congress the power to levy too many different
kinds of taxes, and in potentially undefined amounts. Accordingly, some
proposed that congressional taxation authority be restricted to duties on
imports or indirect taxes on commerce. 114
One of the best Anti-Federalist writers, "Brutus,"'185 described how,
without such limitations, federal revenue demands might come to
dominate American life:
The general legislature will be empowered to lay any tax they
chuse [sic], to annex any penalties they please to the breach of their
revenue laws; and to appoint as many officers as they may think proper
to collect the taxes....
This power, exercised without limitation, will introduce itself into
every comer of the city, and country-It will wait upon the ladies at
their toilett [sic], and will not leave them in any of their domestic
concerns; it will accompany them to the ball, the play, and the
assembly; it will go with them when they visit, and will, on all
occasions, sit beside them in their carriages, nor will it desert them
182. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 148 (speaking at the Virginia ratifying
convention: "I never will give up that darling word requisitions: my country may give it up; a
majority may wrest it from me, but I will never give it up till my grave.").
183. See, e.g., 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 541 ("Agrippa," approving earlier
proposals to give Congress a "limited revenue" with "a right to collect it" and "a moderate duty upon
foreign vessels"); id. at 619 (the Anti-Federalist minority at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,
supporting a Congressional power to impose duties on imports); 2 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 2, at 229 ("Federal Farmer," advocating that the states retaining sole power to levy "internal"
taxes, while conceding to Congress a power to regulate commerce, which was understood to include
a power to levy duties and imposts upon it); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 29-31 (George
Mason, at the Virginia ratifying convention, opposing unconditional federal power to levy "direct"
taxes while favoring such a power conditioned on state disregard for requisitions).
184. For samples of Anti-Federalist arguments of this sort, see 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 619 (Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State
of Pennsylvania); 5 id. at 540 (Agrippa).
185. This was possibly Robert Yates of New York, who had been a constitutional convention
delegate. 2 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 358.
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even at church; it will enter the house of every gentleman, watch over
his cellar, wait upon his cook in the kitchen, follow the servants into the
parlour, preside over the table, and note down all he eats or drinks; it
will attend him to his bedchamber, and watch him while he sleeps; it
will take cognizance of the professional man in his office, or his study;
it will watch the merchant in the counting-house, or in his store; it will
follow the mechanic to his shop, and in his work, and will haunt him in
his family, and in his bed; it will be a constant companion of the
industrious farmer in all his labour, it will be with him in the house, and
in the field, observe the toil of his hands, and the sweat of his brow; it
will penetrate into the most obscure cottage; and finally, it will light
upon the head of every person in the United States. To all these
different classes of people, and in all these circumstances, in which it
will attend them, the language in which it will address them, will be
GIVE! GIVE! 1
8 6
I have quoted the foregoing at length, not because any of the things
that "Brutus" predicted have come to pass, but only to illustrate the Anti-
Federalist position that a very broad taxing power could result in an
intrusive national government. In addition to this argument, "Brutus"'
18 7
and others 88 had another: without more limitations written into the
Constitution, Congress could so monopolize available revenue as to
leave states with an insufficient tax base.
Anti-Federalists soon developed a related argument-that
unprincipled federal judges and politicians might pervert the power to tax
for the "common Defence and general Welfare" into a grant of powers
beyond the right to tax. This was not an argument about the real
meaning of the Taxation Clause. It was a suggestion of how its language
left it vulnerable to the distortions of legal sophistry. A creative soul
denominated "Timoleon" offered an argument of this type in the New
186. 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 112-14; 2 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 2, at 396-97. For other examples of this "excessive taxation" argument, see letter from William
Symmes, Jr. to Peter Osgood, Jr. (Nov. 15, 1787), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
239, and 4 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 57-58; Argument of Amos Singletary, at the
Massachusetts ratifying convention, in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1296; Argument
of General Samuel Thompson, at the same convention, in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 1317; Letter from Federal Farmer to the Republican (Jan. 4, 1788), in 17 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 294.
187. 2 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 366.
188. See, e.g., Letter from Centinel to the People of Pennsylvania (Nov. 30, 1787), reprinted in
13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 333, and 2 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2,
at 140 ("The Congress may construe every purpose for which the state legislatures now lay taxes, to
be for the general welfare, and thereby seize upon every object of revenue."). See also A Federal
Republican, A Review of the Constitution Proposed by the Later Convention (Oct. 28, 1787),
reprinted in 3 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 75 ("The taxation of the particular states
for their own support will be overruled by Congress .... ").
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York Journal on November 1, 1787. "Timoleon" posited a hypothetical
legal opinion (complete with useful Latin maxims) by an unscrupulous
judge sustaining a federal statute to suppress freedom of conscience and
of the press:
By this power, [the hypothetical court opinion states] the right of taxing
is co-extensive with the general welfare, and the general welfare is as
unlimitted [sic] as actions and things are that may disturb or benefit that
general welfare. A right being given to tax for the general welfare....
as necessarily includes a power of protecting, defending, and
promoting it by all such laws and means as are fitted to that end; for,
qui dat finem dat media ad finem necessaria, who gives the end gives
the means necessary to obtain the end. The Constitution must be so
construed as not to involve an absurdity, which would clearly follow
from allowing the end and denying the means. A right of taxing for the
general welfare being the highest and most important mode of
providing for it, cannot be supposed to exclude inferior modes of
effecting the same purpose, because the rule of law is, that, omne majus
continct [sic] in se minus. 189
Warnings against potential abuse of the Taxation Clause were
popular late in 1787. On November 28, John Smilie, an Anti-Federalist
delegate at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, pointed out that the
unlimited power to tax could "be easily perverted to other purposes,"'
190
including destruction of the states' reserved powers. 191 A similar line of
argument appeared in The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the
Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their
Constitutents, 192 issued on December 18, which claimed that Congress
might "abrogate and repeal" state tax laws "upon the allegation that they
interfere with the due collection of their taxes, duties or excises," and
that "Congress might gloss over this conduct by construing every
purpose for which the state legislatures now lay taxes, to be for the
'general welfare,' and therefore as of their jurisdiction."' 93
189. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 534, 535. The final maxim may be translated
(with "continct" duly amended to "continet"), "[tihe entire greater thing contains the lesser within
itself," or, more poetically, "[tihe greater contains within itself the entire lesser."
190. 2 id. at 408.
191. Id. at408-11.
192. Id. at 617.
193. Id. at 627 (emphasis in original), also reprinted in 3 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
2. at 154-55.
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C. Federalist Responses to Early Anti-Federalist Attacks
The Federalists did not respond directly to the "sophistry" argument,
but they challenged directly the charge that the congressional taxing
power would be too broad. One of the most famous responses was
James Wilson's October 6, 1787, speech in the State House Yard in
Philadelphia, in which he contended that federal taxing authority had to
be broad to enable the federal government to fulfill the responsibilities
assigned it.194  This speech was distributed nationally. 95  Other
Federalists made the same argument. Interestingly enough, though, the
examples of congressional responsibilities that they cited all fell within
the powers specifically enumerated in Article I, Section 8. Their most
common example was war.
196
Illustrative was Hamilton's approach in his "Publius" article of
December 18, 1787, later republished as Federalist No. 23:
Shall the Union be constituted the guardian of the common safety? Are
fleets and armies and revenues necessary to this purpose? The
government of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to
make all regulations which have relation to them. The same must be
the case in respect to commerce, and to every other matter to which its
194. Id. at 167, 171.
On the 2d point to wit, security against danger from abroad, it is no less evident that
Requisitions will fatally deceive us. For the same reason that they will not obtain from
the States their respective shares of Contribution and thence become a source of intestine
quarrels, they must invite foreign attacks by shewing [sic] the inability of the Union to
repel them: and when attacks are made, must leave the Union to defend itself, if it be
defended at all, as was done during the late war; by a waste of blood, a distruction [sic] of
property, and outrages on private rights, unknown in any Country which has credit or
money to employ the regular means of defence.
Letter from James Madison to George Thompson (Jan. 29, 1789), in 2 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, art. I, § 8, cl. 1, no. 17.
195. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 337-38.
196. See, e.g., 2 id. at 413-14 (quoting Thomas McKean, at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention, arguing that the taxing power given was necessary for the purposes of the union. "But
we must divest ourselves of this extravagant jealousy, and remember that it is necessary to repose
some degree of confidence in the administration of a government from which we expect the revival
of commerce, the encouragement of arts, and the general happiness of the people."); 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 190-91 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth, speaking at the Connecticut ratifying
convention); id. at 66-67 (quoting Christopher Gore, at the Massachusetts ratifying convention,
giving the example of the need for funds for armies and navies); id. at 79 (quoting John Choate, at
the Massachusetts ratifying convention, stating that revenue must be equal to exigencies of union,
and mentioning war); id. at 84-85 (quoting James Bowdoin, at the same convention, mentioning the
need for power to be equal to exigencies, and citing examples of war and public safety); id. at 78-79
(quoting Colonel Joseph B. Vamrnm at the same convention, giving war as an example of the need
for taxation and stating that it was apparent Congress had no right to alter the internal relations of a
state); 3 id. at 227-28 (quoting John Marshall, at the Virginia ratifying convention, giving the
example of war).
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jurisdiction is permitted to extend. Is the administration of justice
between the citizens of the same State the proper department of the
local governments? These must possess all the authorities which are
connected with this object, and with every other that may be allotted to
their particular cognizance and direction. Not to confer in each case a
degree of power commensurate to the end would be to violate the most
obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to trust the
great interests of the nation to hands which are disabled from managing
them with vigor and success. 197
Hamilton followed this with a similar argument (compiled as Federalist
No. 30) just ten days later, 198 yet another (No. 31)199 on January 1, and
200Ostill another (No. 34) on January 5. Congress simply could not, he and
other Federalists maintained, carry out its specifically enumerated
powers without a broad authority to tax.
D. The Anti-Federalists Take Off the Gloves
As noted earlier, the Constitution uses the verb "provide" in a future-
looking sense. Spending money is not "providing," but legislation for
future eventualities might be. 20 1  Thus, a clause allowing Congress to
"provide for the common Defence and general Welfare" could suggest a
regulatory power to some. This suggestion may have been the germ of
197. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, supra note 2, at 155.
198. Id. No. 30at 190-91:
Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone equal to the present
and future exigencies of the Union?... Let us attend to what would be the effects of this
situation in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will
presume, for argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties answers the
purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace establishment for the Union.
Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the probable conduct of the
government in such an emergency? Taught by experience that proper dependence could
not be placed on the success of requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of
fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to
the expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper objects to the
defense of the State?
199. Id. No. 31 at 194-95:
As the duties of superintending the national defense and of securing the public peace
against foreign or domestic violence involve a provision for casualties and dangers to
which no possible limits can be assigned, the power of making that provision ought to
know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the resources of the
community.
200. Id. No. 34 at 207-08:
There ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies as they may happen;
and as these are illimitable in their nature, so it is impossible safely to limit that capacity.
• . . The support of a navy and of naval wars would involve contingencies that must
baffle all the efforts of political arithmetic.
201. Supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
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the plenary interpretation of the General Welfare Clause-the notion that
the Clause gives Congress a general legislative authority. In any event,
Richard Henry Lee was promoting this construction in private
correspondence as early as October, 1787.202 Around the same time the
great lexicographer, Noah Webster, alluded to (and rebutted) it in his
pamphlet supporting the Constitution.2 °3
However, the plenary interpretation was slow to enter the general
debate, perhaps because the structure of the document rendered that
interpretation implausible.204  That it eventually became a central
argument of the Anti-Federalists may reflect growing desperation on
their side.
In an essay written in October, 1787, "Brutus," like "Timoleon, '2 °5
took the position that the General Welfare Clause was, in form at least, a
206limitation on the taxing power-although an ineffectual one. In
202. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (Oct. 5, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 36, 37; Lee to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16, 1787), in id. at 61-62.
203. Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 2, at 50; see also 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 303 ("A Querist," raising on November 24, 1787, the Anti-Federalist argument that the General
Welfare Clause gives Congress the right to extend its terms of office); id. at 293-96 ("A Customer,"
raising on November 23, 1787 a plenary view drawn not from the General Welfare Clause, but from
the Preamble and the Necessary and Proper Clause).
204. Supra Part IV(A).
205. Supra note 186 and accompanying text.
206. Letter from Brutus to the New York Journal (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 2 Storing, ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 365. See also letter from Brutus to the New York Journal (Dec. 27,
1787), reprinted in 2 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 397-98, and 15 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 114-15 (Letter No. VI):
But it is said, by some of the advocates of this system, "That the idea that Congress
can levy taxes at pleasure, is false, and the suggestion wholly unsupported: that the
preamble to the constitution is declaratory of the purposes of the union, and the
assumption of any power not necessary to establish justice, &c. to provide for the
common defence, &c. will be unconstitutional. Besides, in the very clause which gives
the power of levying duties and taxes, the purposes to which the money shall be
appropriated, are specified, viz. to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence
and general welfare." I would ask those, who reason thus, to define what ideas are
included under the terms, to provide for the common defence and general welfare? Are
these terms definite, and will they be understood in the same manner, and to apply to the
same cases by every one? No one will pretend they will. It will then be matter of
opinion, what tends to the general welfare; and the Congress will be the only judges in
the matter ....
It is as absurd to say, that the power of Congress is limited by these general
expressions, "to provide for the common safety, and general welfare," as it would be to
say, that it would be limited, had the constitution said they should have power to lay
taxes, & at will and pleasure.
William Symmes, Jr.'s argument at the Massachusetts ratifying convention also can be construed as
saying the same thing: that the General Welfare Clause was a limitation in form only, and not in
substance. See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 74 (claiming that the clause is "too general to
be understood as any kind of limitation of the power of Congress").
2003] THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 37
December, however, he began to publicize the "plenary view. 2°7 By
January of the following year, stung by swift ratification in four states in
less than a month, 208 Anti-Federalists were pushing the plenary view at
full throttle. Silas Lee wrote to George Thatcher that the General
Welfare Clause gave the federal government regulatory and spending
power "to extend to every matter of legislation" 2°9 and speculated that
the General Welfare Clause would enable Congress to control the
press. 2  Also in January, the Anti-Federalist author "A Countryman"
published an article taking the same tack. 211  "Brutus" followed with
another barrage in February212 as did the "Deliberator," who repeated the
charge that the General Welfare Clause would give Congress the power
213to establish a state religion. William Symmes, Jr., at the
Massachusetts ratifying convention, made an argument that can be
construed as plenary as well, for he averred that "general welfare" might
apply to expenditures, too; indeed "any expenditure whatever."
214
By the spring of 1788, statements of the plenary view were found all
215over America. At the New York ratifying convention in June, John
207. See letter from Brutus to the New York Journal (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 2 Storing,
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 388-89 (approving the plenary view); 19 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 410-16 ("Brutus," Letter V, Dec. 13, 1787).
208. Delaware ratified on December 7, 1787; Pennsylvania on December 12; New Jersey on
December 18; and Georgia on December 31. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 21-22.
Of course, people in the North would not have heard about Georgia's ratification until well into
January.
209. Letter from Silas Lee to George Thatcher (Jan. 23, 1788), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 782; see also letter from "0" to the American Herald (Feb. 4, 1788), reprinted in 5
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 854-55 (fearing that the government will become
"supreme and unchecked").
210. Letter from Silas Lee to George Thatcher (Jan. 23, 1788), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 782.
211. 6 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 87.
212. 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 75; 2 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
2, at 424.
213. 3 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 179.
214. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 74. Symmes' argument was cited for the
Hamiltonian view in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), arguably a misuse of the citation,
since Symmes was at that time an Anti-Federalist and Federalists represented his position as
erroneous. The General Welfare Clause: The Hamiltonian and Madisonian Views, supra note 7, at
11. Not surprisingly, both briefs suffer from a selective use of history, and in neither is ratification
history satisfactorily explored. Moreover, Symmes may have been trying to show merely that the
General Welfare Clause was in form a limitation, but ineffectual as such. See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 74 ("These words, sir, I confess, are an ornament to the page, and very musical
words; but they are too general to be understood as any kind of limitation of the power of Congress.
.. .").
215. In addition to the references in the text, see 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
259 (address to the members of the New York and Virginia Conventions, post Apr. 30, 1788); 10 id.
at 1332 (The Virginia Convention, June 16, 1788); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 449 (The
Virginia Ratifying Convention); THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 48 ("Leonidas," a London
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Williams argued that the General Welfare Clause would give Congress
216almost complete power, including the power to "essentially destroy[]"
217the state governments. At the Virginia convention, Patrick Henry
contended that the clause would grant Congress authority to billet armies
218on the people and emancipate slaves. In the same venue, George
Mason repeated the charges that the General Welfare Clause could be
used to infringe liberty of the press and trial by jury.219  "Sydney"
(Robert Yates) in articles published in New York on June 13 and 14,
1788, also took the plenary line.22°
E. Federalist Responses, Representations, and Enumerations
The Federalists did not wait long to respond. They assured the
public that the General Welfare Clause was not a grant of plenary power
at all, and that the Constitution should be viewed as creating a
government of carefully circumscribed authority. James Madison's
comments were published on January 20, 1788:
It has been urged and echoed that the power "to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the
common defense and general welfare of the United States," amounts to
an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be
alleged to be necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No
writer, whose essay was first printed in the LONDON TIMES) (Morton Borden ed., 1965), available at
http://www.constitution.org.
216. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 330.
217. Id. at 338.
218. See 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 1299 ("[Congress] may billet them on the
people at pleasure."); 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 590 ("[M]ay they not pronounce all
slaves free, and will they not be warranted by that power?").
219. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 441-42:
Among the enumerated powers, Congress are to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,
and excises, and to pay the debts, and to provide for the general welfare and common
defence; and by that clause (so often called the sweeping clause) they are to make all
laws necessary to execute those laws. Now, suppose oppressions should arise under this
government, and any writer should dare to stand forth, and expose to the community at
large the abuses of those powers; could not Congress, under the idea of providing for the
general welfare, and under their own construction, say that this was destroying the
general peace, encouraging sedition, and poisoning the minds of the people? And could
they not, in order to provide against this, lay a dangerous restriction on the press?...
Might they not thus destroy the trial by jury? Would they not extend their implication?
It appears to me that they may and will .... That Congress should have power to
provide for the general welfare of the Union, I grant. But I wish a clause in the
Constitution, with respect to all powers which are not granted, that they are retained by
the states. Otherwise, the power of providing for the general welfare may be perverted to
its destruction.
220. 6 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 113, 120.
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stronger proof could be given of the distress under which these writers
labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.
Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the
Congress been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions
just cited, the authors of the objection might have had some color for it;
though it would have been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a
form of describing an authority to legislate in all possible cases. A
power to destroy the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to
regulate the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be
very singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for the general
welfare."
But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the
objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows and is
not even separated by a longer pause than a semicolon? . . . For what
purpose could the enumeration of particular powers be inserted, if these
and all others were meant to be included in the preceding general
power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general
phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But
the idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor
qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to
confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the
dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the
authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty of supposing had
not its origin with the latter.
The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the
language used by the convention is a copy from the Articles of
Confederation .... 
221
Madison was only one of many Federalists to issue such
representations. These representations were stated in various ways and
with various degrees of eloquence, but their basic message was that the
language in question was not a grant at all-rather it was a restriction on
federal authority.222  Thus, the pro-Constitution essayist "Cassius"
asserted that the General Welfare Clause was not
a power coextensive with every possible object of human legislation.
A moment's calm reflection must have informed you, that no such
legislative latitude is given to the house of representatives, except in the
imposition of taxes, and in that branch, it must, necessarily, be
intrusted, because the line could not be drawn. Congress can make no
221. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 2, at 262-63.
222. That the General Welfare Clause is in form a limitation seems to have been conceded
initially by "Brutus," the best lawyer among the Anti-Federalist writers, although he didn't think the
limitation particularly effective. 2 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 365-66.
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
laws, except such, as are, essentially, necessary to carry into execution
the particular powers given to them by the constitution.
223
The issue was particularly hard-fought at the Virginia ratifying
convention, where, as we have seen, Patrick Henry firmly urged the
plenary view.224 Several Federalists responded.225 One of the clearest
statements came from Governor Randolph:
I appeal to the candor of the honorable gentleman [Patrick Henry], and
if he thinks it an improper appeal, I ask the gentlemen here, whether
there be a general, indefinite power of providing for the general
welfare? The power is, "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and
general welfare;" so that they can only raise money by these means, in
order to provide for the general welfare. No man who reads it can say
it is general, as the honorable gentleman represents it. You must
violate every rule of construction and common sense, if you sever it
from the power of raising money, and annex it to any thing else, in
order to make it that formidable power which it is represented to be.226
Later we shall examine additional Federalist representations specific to
the General Welfare Clause.227
Federalist reassurances on the restricted scope of national power took
other forms as well. For example, at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention, James Wilson predicted that, "the taxes of the general
government (if any shall be laid) will be more equitable, and much less
expensive, than those imposed by state government." 228  James
Madison, Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth, and other
223. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 714.
224. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
225. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 244-45 (George Nicholas); id. at 301 (Edmund
Pendleton).
226. Id. at 599-600. Randolph also weighed in, having this to say:
But the rhetoric of the gentleman has highly colored the dangers of giving the general
government an indefinite power of providing for the general welfare. I contend that no
such power is given. They have power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States." Is this an independent, separate, substantive power, to provide for the
general welfare of the United States? No, sir.
5 id. at 466. See also 3 id. at 207 (Edmund Randolph, at the same convention, again discussing
the meaning of the clause).
227. See infra notes 260-68 and accompanying text.
228. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 482.
229. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra note 2, ch. 17, doc. 22, at 644 ("[T]o draw a line of demarkation which would give to the
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Federalists argued in public, 231 as they had contended privately at the
232federal convention, that the states would enjoy control over their
"internal police. ' 233 One instance of this argument was offered by Noah
Webster, who wrote that, "the powers of the Congress are defined, to
extend only to those matters which are in their nature and effects,
general .... [T]he Congress cannot meddle with the internal police of
General Government every power requisite for general purposes, and leave to the States every power
which might be most beneficially administered by them.").
230. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 492 (Letter from Roger Sherman and Oliver
Ellsworth to Governor Huntington (Sept. 26, 1787)).
231. For examples of such statements at the state ratifying conventions, see 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 78 (Col. Joseph B. Varnum, speaking at the Massachusetts ratifying
convention); id. at 241 (John Williams, at the New York ratifying convention opining that "[tihe
constitution should be so formed as not to swallow up the state governments: the general
government ought to be confined to certain national objects; and the states should retain such powers
as concern their own internal police"); id. at 283 (John Jay, speaking at the same convention); id. at
385 (Chancellor Robert Livingston, speaking at the same convention); 3 id. at 259 (James Madison,
speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention); 4 id. at 38 (James Iredell, speaking at the North
Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 160 (William Davie, speaking at the same convention); Letter
of Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler (Oct. 8, 1787), in 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 102-
03 ("The powers of the General Government are so defined as not to destroy the Sovereignty of the
Individual States."); 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 190 ("One of the People" writing
that internal matters are reserved to the states); 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 458
(Tench Coxe, writing as "A Freeman," stating "nor can they [Congress] do any other matter or thing
appertaining to the internal affairs of any state, whether legislative, executive or judicial, civil or
ecclesiastical."). Other quotations are collected in BERGER, supra note 2, at 66-76.
Anti-Federalists sometimes adopted the same distinction. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 2, at 332 (Melancton Smith, speaking at the New York ratifying convention).
232. For examples of such statements at the federal convention, see I CONVENTION RECORDS,
supra note 2, at 157 (James Wilson opined that "[tlhe state governments ought to be preserved-the
freedom of the people and their internal good police depends on their existence in full vigor-but
such a government can only answer local purposes"); id. at 165 ("Mr. Williamson was agst. giving a
power that might restrain the States from regulating their internal police."); id. at 439 (Luther
Martin, later an Anti-Federalist, stating that, "[a] general government may operate on individuals in
cases of general concern, and still be federal. This distinction is with the states, as states,
represented by the people of those states. States will take care of their internal police and local
concerns. The general government has no interest, but the protection of the whole."); 2 id. at 25
(reporting Roger Sherman "observed that it would be difficult to draw the line between the powers
of the Genl. Legislatures, and those to be left with the States; that he did not like the definition
contained in the Resolution, and proposed in place of the words 'of individual legislation' line 4
inclusive, to insert 'to make laws binding on the people of the <United> States in all cases <which
may concern the common interests of the Union>; but not to interfere with <the Government of the
individual States in any matters of internal police which respect the Govt. of such States only, and
wherein the General> welfare of the U. States is not concerned."'); id. at 26 (reporting Edmund
Randolph said, "[tihis is a formidable idea indeed. It involves the power of violating all the laws and
constitutions of the States, and of intermeddling with their police."); id. at 198 (Rufus King stating,
"[t]he most numerous objects of legislation belong to the States. Those of the Natl. Legislature were
but few. The chief of them were commerce & revenue").
233. For the accepted meaning of "internal" governance, see supra note 126.
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any State, or abridge its Sovereignty., 234 Madison penned probably the
best known comment of this sort:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be
exercised principally on external objects, such as war, peace,
negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of
taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to
the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State.235
Such reassurances still were not enough for the Anti-Federalists,
however, who wanted more specificity as to what the scope of federal
236prerogatives would be. They pointed out that the Constitution denied
the central government power in some areas, but those exclusions were
comparatively narrow. If this was to be a regime of strictly limited
authority, then exactly what would be reserved to the states?
237
234. Noah Webster, America, in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE "OTHER"
FEDERALISTS: 1787-1788, at 169, 176 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998); see
also 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 492 (Oliver Elseworth and Rufus King
distinguishing between state or local objects and federal or general objects); Alexander Contee
Hanson, Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a Federal Government, in Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note
2, at 217, 252 (writing that states retain "the whole internal government of their respective
republics").
235. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 2, at 292-93. Cf A Native of Virginia, in 9
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 655, 692 (stating that, "[t]o [the state legislatures] is left
the whole domestic government of the states; they may still regulate the rules of property, the rights
of persons, every thing that relates to their internal police, and whatever effects [sic] neither foreign
affairs nor the rights of the other States").
236. See, e.g., Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the House of Delegates of
Virginia (Oct. 10, 1787), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 482, 491 (listing specific limits to
Federal power that he wanted included in the Constitution); Letter from The Hon. Elbridge Gerry to
The Hon. Samuel Adams, President of the Massachusetts Senate & The Hon. James Warren,
Speaker of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, id. at 492-93 (stating reasons for not
signing the Federal Constitution); Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jan. 9, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 2, at 1, 81 (Rev. Samuel Niles asking what limits on Congress were included in the
Constitution). Sometimes a Federalist admitted that the lines were rightly vague. See, e.g., id. at 84
(James Bowdoin, speaking at the Massachusetts ratifying convention).
237. Debates in the Convention of Pennsylvania, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at
398, 427 (Robert Whitehill, speaking at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention). The primary
enumeration of powers denied occurs in U.S. CONST. art. L § 9, and includes, but is not limited to,
protection from suspensions of the writ of habeas corpus and from bills of attainder. Federalist
Jasper Yeates, at the same convention, responded to Whitehill's argument by stating that the
enumerated items in Article I, Section 9 were merely exceptions to enumerated powers. Id. at 435.
This counter-argument may have proven too much, and does not seem to have been widely used.
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Federalist essayists and orators answered this challenge by publicly
enumerating particular powers and classes of powers to be exercised
concurrently or exclusively by the states. Short lists of state powers
came from a variety of Federalist speakers and writers, especially
prominent lawyers. Among them were these conspicuous founders, all
of them lawyers: Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, James Wilson,
Edmund Pendleton (the Chancellor of Virginia), John Marshall (a
Federalist spokesman at the Virginia ratifying convention and later Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court), and James Iredell (a former
judge, state attorney general, ratification convention delegate in North
Carolina, and later Justice of the United States Supreme Court). In
addition, several anonymous Federalist authors provided short
enumerations.238
More complete enumerations came from the pens of other Federalist
writers, anonymous 239 and otherwise-again, several of them lawyers.
Justice Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court (and shortly thereafter, Chief Justice), included an
enumeration of state powers in a letter sent to Samuel Otis, a member of
Congress. 240 Alexander White, a distinguished Virginia lawyer,
published another. White was a member of the House of Burgesses
before the Revolution, a member of the House of Delegates after the
Revolution, and a delegate at the Virginia ratifying convention in
2411788. Perhaps most influential were the widely distributed
enumerations penned by Alexander Contee Hanson, a Congressman from
,,242243Maryland writing as "Aristides, '242 and by businessman Tench Coxe.
238. Natelson, supra note 2, at 479.
239. A.B., Letter to the Editor, HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 1788, in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 596, 599; Letter to the Members of the Convention of Massachusetts,
MASS. CENTINEL, Jan. 9, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 651-52.
Both clearly were intended to be relied on. The former was in specific response to the claims of the
Anti-Federalist essayist "Brutus" that the Constitution imposed insufficient limits on the federal
government. A.B., supra, at 596, 599. The latter was reprinted in two other papers. In one, the
Massachusetts Centinel, the piece was published under the headline, "'READ THIS! READ
THIS!"' Letter to the Members of the Convention in Massachusetts, supra, at 652 n. 1.
240. Nathaniel Peaslee Sarjeant, Letter of Chief Justice Sarjeant of Massachusetts, in 1 THE
NEW ENGLAND HISTORICAL & GENEOLOGICAL REGISTER 237-39, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 563, 568.
241. The relevant (first) portion of White's essay (with explanatory annotations) is found at 8
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 401-08.
242. Alexander Contee Hanson, Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a Federal Government, in
Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 2, at 217. On March 27, 1788, Hanson wrote to Tench Coxe of the
"avidity, with which I am informed my humble essay has been bought up ...." Letter from
Alexander Contee Hanson to Tench Coxe (Mar. 27, 1788), in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 520-21.
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Coxe, in fact, has been credited as the single individual most responsible
for shaping public understanding of the Constitution.2" All of these
enumerations were remarkably consistent, with much overlap, but
relatively little dispute among Federalist writers about which powers
were reserved to the states.
I previously have written about the content of these enumerations of
state powers.245 In capsule form, Federalist representations were that,
outside the capital district, national authority would not include the
following objects:246
* training the militia and appointing militia officers;
• control over local government;
• regulation of real property;
* regulation of personal property outside of commerce;
* control over domestic and family affairs;
* control over crimes malum in se, except treason, piracy, and
counterfeiting;
* control over state court systems;
* the law of torts and contracts, except in suits between citizens of
different states;
control of religion and education and establishment of religious and
educational institutions;
* services for the poor and unfortunate; and
* control of agriculture and other business enterprises.
F. Implications of the Federalist Response for the Plenary and
Hamilton-Story Views
Obviously, these Federalist representations are inconsistent with a
plenary view of the General Welfare Clause. They are equally
inconsistent with the Hamilton-Story view that federal spending is not
limited to the powers otherwise enumerated, if only because several
243. Tench Coxe, Letter from "A Freeman" to the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania,
PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1788, reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 453, 457-
58; Tench Coxe, Letter from "A Freeman" to The Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania, PA.
GAZETTE, Jan. 30, 1788, reprinted in id. at 508-10; Tench Coxe, Letter from "A Freeman" to The
Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania, PA. GAzETrE, Feb. 6, 1788, reprinted in 16 id. at 49-
50.
244. JACOB E. COOKE, TENCH COXE AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 111 (1978). For background
information on Coxe, see Stephen P. Halbrook & David B. Kopel, Tench Coxe and the Right to Keep
and Bear Arms 1787-1823,7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 347 (1999).
245. Natelson, supra note 2.
246. Id.
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items on the list of enumerated state powers-such as the establishment
of religious and educational institutions and services for the poor-
involve expenditures of money.247 If the states had the exclusive right to
spend money on such things, then the federal government could not have
the unlimited right-or, indeed, any right-to spend on them.
Additionally, as I have pointed out elsewhere, insofar as the Hamilton-
Story view is used to support federal grants in aid to states in areas
outside the enumerated powers, the view is inconsistent with the
founding generation's strong constitutional policy of preventing financial
dependence by one level of government on another.
One might ask why, in their attacks on the plenary view, Federalists
never rebutted the Hamilton-Story view specifically. The answer is that
the Hamilton-Story view made no defined appearance in the pre-
ratification debates, 249 because it had not been invented. Hamilton
devised it in 1791, a full two years after the new government was under
way. He did so, apparently, for political purposes-to promote his
Report on Manufactures (Report). Insofar, however, as the Report
247. Moreover, Tench Coxe represented certain taxes-those on state offices-as outside the
federal power. See 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 51 (writing as "A Freeman").
248. Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike emphasized the importance of assuring that branches
of government were independent of each other, so as to be more reliably dependent on the people.
This policy applied among the federal branches (Senate, House, President, and Judiciary) and
between the state and federal levels of government. It applied with particular force to prevent
branches closer to the people (e.g., the states) from being dependent on branches farther from the
people (e.g., the federal government). The historical record copiously supports this as a fundamental
policy even more powerful than separation of powers. See generally Natelson, supra note 23, at
402-05 (discussing the reasons for promoting independence among governmental entities). For
dependencies limited to more remote branches on less remote ones, see id. at 407.
249. William Symmes, Jr., at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, did argue that "general
welfare" might apply to expenditures, too; indeed "any expenditure whatever." 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 2, at 74. However, he seems to have been making the argument only that the
clause was not effective as a limitation. If his statement is construed as saying that the General
Welfare Clause is a grant of power, it is not the Hamilton-Story view, because he does not
distinguish it from statements of the plenary view by denying that the General Welfare Clause gave
Congress plenary authority to regulate.
250. Hamilton wrote as follows:
[T]he power to raise money is plenary, and indefinite; and the objects to which it may be
appropriated are no less comprehensive, than the payment of the public debts and the
providing for the common defence and "general Welfare." The terms "general Welfare"
were doubtless intended to signify more than was expressed or imported in those which
Preceded; otherwise numerous exigencies incident to the affairs of a Nation would have
been left without a provision. The phrase is as comprehensive as any that could have
been used; because it was not fit that the constitutional authority of the Union, to
appropriate its revenues shou'd have been restricted within narrower limits than the
"General Welfare" and because this necessarily embraces a vast variety of particulars,
which are susceptible neither of specification nor of definition.
It is therefore of necessity left to the discretion of the National Legislature, to
pronounce, upon the objects, which concern the general Welfare, and for which under
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
contends for a federal power to interfere in agriculture and similar areas,
it is in direct contradiction to the position he took while promoting
ratification. In his 1791 "Report" he wrote, "there seems to be no room
for a doubt that whatever concerns the general Interests of learning of
Agriculture of Manufactures and of Commerce are within the sphere of
the national Councils as far as regards an application of Money."251 Yet
before ratification, he had assured the public that "supervision of
agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature . . . can never be
desirable cares of a general jurisdiction.' 252 Again, he had written of a
system in which "encouragement of agriculture and manufactures" were
"subjects of state expenditures. 253  In discussing the need for broad
taxation power, he had been careful to limit his list of "exigencies" to
254those within the enumerated powers.
This sort of contradiction is one reason I often have wondered why
some take Hamilton's Report on Manufactures seriously as a source of
"original understanding." As a post eventum statement, it is inherently
less reliable as evidence of agreement than statements (including
Hamilton's) issued to induce ratification. Moreover, it would be difficult
to find a participant in the constitutional debates who was less reflective
of mainstream views than Hamilton. He was a political outlier even
among the strongly nationalist majority at the constitutional convention,
and he spent comparatively little time there. Of the finished
Constitution, he admitted that "[n]o man's ideas were more remote from
the plan than his own were known to be. 255  If that were all, citing
Hamilton's post eventum political statements as evidence of the public
agreement would be a little like assessing the goals of the Clinton
administration through subsequent statements by Senator Jesse Helms-
probative, perhaps, but only minimally so.
Yet it is worse than that. There is evidence that as soon as the
Constitution was signed, Hamilton was secretly plotting to betray it. His
unpublished paper of September 1787, written within two weeks of the
that description, an appropriation of money is requisite and proper. And there seems to
be no room for a doubt that whatever concerns the general Interests of learning of
Agriculture of Manufactures and of Commerce are within the sphere of the national
Councils as far as regards an application of Money.
Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra note 2, art. I, § 8, cl. 1, doc. 21, at 446-47.
251. Id. at 447.
252. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 2, at 118.
253. Id. No. 34, supra note 2, at 209.
254. See generally id. NOS. 30, 31, 34, supra note 2 (focusing heavily on utilizing revenue for
purposes of national defense and security).
255. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 645-46.
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time the national convention adjourned on the 17th, reveals him to be
dallying with the notion of reunion with Great Britain ("not much to be
feared") 256 and looking forward to a Washington presidency in which the
national government may "triumph altogether over the state governments
and reduce them into an entire subordination, dividing the large states
into smaller districts., 257 This mental state implies that Hamilton's post
eventum statements are completely worthless as evidence of common
understanding. In fact, it suggests that those statements may have
negative value, i.e., may tend to disprove that understanding.
In summary, the ratification debates support the conclusion that the
General Welfare Clause grants no independent authority to Congress, to
spend or otherwise. Anti-Federalist suggestions that it might grant
independent power were firmly rebutted by Federalists. The Federalists'
agreement to the Tenth Amendment was their seal on the bargain.
VI1. THE COURSE OF THE RATIFICATION DEBATE: THE GENERAL
WELFARE CLAUSE AS A "PUBLIC TRUST" LIMITATION
A. The General Welfare Clause as a Limitation on the Use of Tax
Revenue
Textual analysis suggests that the General Welfare Clause is more
than a mere "non-power"-that it is a limitation on the scope of the
258taxing power. Textual analysis also suggests the nature of the
limitation: the Clause limits the purposes for which Congress can tax
and, indirectly, the purposes for which tax money can be used.259
The last two Parts have shown that the federal convention intended,
and the ratification process confirmed, the status of the General Welfare
Clause as a limitation. This Part examines what the ratification debate
tells us about the nature of that limitation.
Early in the debate, Noah Webster offered the following insight:
Besides, in the very clause which gives the power of levying duties and
taxes, the purposes to which the money shall be appropriated are
256. This statement is ambiguous in that it could mean (1) it is not likely to happen or (2) it
wouldn't be such a bad thing. The context, coupled with Hamilton's monarchical proclivities,
makes it possible he had the latter meaning in mind. See 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 278 ("The most plausible shape of such a business would be the establishment of a son of the
present monarch in the supreme government of this country with a family compact.").
257. Id.
258. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
specified, viz. to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and
general welfare of the United States. For these purposes money must
be collected ....260
In a footnote he added:
Any powers not promotive of these purposes, will be
unconstitutional;-consequently any appropriations of money to any
other purpose will expose the Congress to the resentment of the states,
and the members to impeachment and loss of their seats.26'
This would appear to match the conclusions of textual analysis.
In February, 1788, the Charleston Columbian Herald published an
essay by David Ramsey, a South Carolina Federalist writing under the
name of "Civis." The essay was subsequently circulated in pamphlet and
newspaper form in South Carolina, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia.262 It included the following words: "You may observe, that
[Congress's] future power is confined to provide for the common defence
and general welfare of the United States. If they apply money to any
other purposes, they exceed their powers., 263  Similarly, a pamphlet
published in April by "A Native of Virginia," and circulated in that
Commonwealth, stated, "It is here to be observed, that all taxes, imposts,
&c. are to be applied only for the common defence and general welfare,
of the United States. By no possibility will the words admit of any other
construction.,, 264  He went on to argue that this limitation prevented
"peculation, bribery, and corruption, and of the probability of the public
Treasury from being converted to the use of the President and
Congress. 265 The term "corruption" generally was understood at the
time to mean, not merely theft (that was covered by the word
"peculation"), but the use of government power and assets to benefit
localities or other special interests ("factions").266
The nature of the general welfare limitation was explored at the
Virginia ratifying convention. One delegate, Henry Lee (of
267Westmoreland), said that the result of the General Welfare Clause is
260. Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 2, at 50.
261. Id.at5l.
262. 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 21.
263. Id. at 22. The essay was also printed in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION: WRITINGS OF THE
"OTHER" FEDERALISTS: 1787-1788, at 451 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998).
264. 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 669.
265. Id.
266. See infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text.
267. Not to be confused with the Ant-Federalist Henry Lee of Bourbon.
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that "[Congress] can take no more of our money than is necessary to pay
our share of the public debts, and provide for the general welfare.",
268
Governor Randolph said, "[t]he plain and obvious meaning of this is, that
no more duties, taxes, imposts, and excises, shall be laid, than are
sufficient to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and
general welfare, of the United States., 269 George Nicholas argued, "[t]he
debts of the Union ought to be paid. Ought not the common defence to
be provided for? Is it not necessary to provide for the general welfare?
It has been fully proved that this power could not be given to another
body. The amounts to be raised are confined to these purposes solely. 27 °
B. The Trust Principle behind the General Welfare Clause
It would appear, therefore, that the goal of the General Welfare
Clause was to limit all congressional taxation and spending to general
interest, as opposed to local or special interest, purposes. The concept
seems alien in today's "broker state"-the "aristocracy of pull '"271 -
where the barter and appropriation of billions of dollars of pork is a
regular occurrence on the floor of Congress: subsidies for North Carolina
tobacco farmers in exchange for museums in Ohio, and the like. That is
one reason, I think, why in more recent times the General Welfare Clause
has been so grossly misinterpreted. Yet when the Constitution was
ratified, limiting taxes and spending to general welfare purposes was part
of the reigning Whig notion of responsible government.
Recall that one of the principal grievances the American colonies
had with Great Britain was Britain's practice of imposing taxes and then
diverting the money to the benefit of people other than those who paid
the bills; John Dickinson's influential essays had centered partly on this
272issue. Furthermore, Britain had deployed government power to grant
franchises and monopolies to influential groups. Dickinson fulminated
273
against this sort of thing as well, in his Two Letters on the Tea Tax.
Such experiences-coupled with the writings of prominent British
268. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 181.
269. Id. at 207; see also id. at 599 ("I appeal to the candor of the honorable gentleman, and if he
thinks it an improper appeal, I ask the gentlemen here, whether there be a general, indefinite power
of providing for the general welfare? The power is, 'to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare;' so that they can
only raise money by these means, in order to provide for the general welfare.").
270. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 244.
271. AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED 379 (35th Anniversary ed. 1992).
272. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
273. John Dickinson, Two Letters on the Tea Tax, in 1 POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2, at
457.
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writers admired by American Whigs274 -had instilled a concept of
government that we would identify as essentially fiduciary in nature.,
Public officials were seen as the people's agents and trustees, and bound
by something akin to private trust standards.275  Long. before Grover
Cleveland appropriated the statement, 276 James Madison, wrote in The
Federalist that "governments are in fact . . agents and trustees of the
people. 277 Indeed, Madison's contributions to The Federalist contain
278
many references to the "public trust" government officials exercise.
279Alexander Hamilton also employed that term. 7  John Dickinson's
274. For example, John Locke made extensive use of the trust analogy. See JOHN LOCKE, OF
CIVIL GOVERNMENT: SECOND TREATISE 18 (Russell Kirk, intro. 1955) ("nor under the dominion of
any will or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it");
id. at 110 ("to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust"); id. at 113-14 ("[T]he community put
the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by
declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property, will still be at the same uncertainty as it was
in the state of nature."); id. at 116-17 ("But government, into whosesoever hands it is put, being as I
have before shown, entrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men might have and secure
their properties"); id. at 129 ("The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative, placed in the
executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it, but is [a] fiduciary trust placed in him, for the
safety of the people."), and passim.
Henry St. John Bolingbroke, actually a Tory, was influential among American Whigs. See, e.g.,
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 39-40 n.23 (1967).
His popular essays were replete with references to public service as a "trust" and public officers as
"trustees." See, e.g., 2 HENRY ST. JOHN BOLINGBROKE, A Dissertation Upon Parties, in THE
WORKS OF LORD BOLINGBROKE (1967); id. at 45 (a representative in Parliament is the people's
trustee); id. at 93 (a representative has a "great and noble trust"); id. at 100 (the king serves as trustee
of the public revenues); id. at 101 ("the people should have frequent opportunities of calling their
representatives to account, as it were, for the discharge of the trust committed to them").
Cato's Letters, a series of essays by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, were popular in
America and replete with the language of public trust. 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON,
CATO'S LETTERS 111, 142, 179, 267, 411,415,416 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 1995); 2 id. at 558.
Samuel von Pufendorf, one of the most popular jurists of the time, had not used explicitly the
language of public trust, but had contended for a long list of trust-style duties on rulers. Among
these were governing for the public welfare, acquiring necessary knowledge, ultimate responsibility
of the ruler for ministers, impartiality and the equitable distribution of burdens among citizens,
conservation of assets, and avoidance of faction. 2 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF
MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO THE NATURAL LAW (Frank Gardner Moore, photo reprint 1964
(1682)), available at http://www.constitution.org/puf/puf-dut.htm.
275. For a discussion of how a government can be bound by fiduciary standards, see Robert G.
Natelson, The Government as Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration from the Reign of Trajan, 35 U.
RICH. L. REV. 191 (2001).
276. After Grover Cleveland said, "We are the trustees and agents of our fellow citizens," W.C.
Hudson, a newspaper reporter then working for Cleveland, changed it to "[plublic office is a public
trust" with Cleveland's permission. To his credit, Cleveland always admitted that the snappier line
was not his. William Safire, How to Write a Memoir, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1988, at 23.
277. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 2, at 294; see also GARRY WILLS, JAMES MADISON
32-33 (2002) (defining Madison's view of legislation as judicial-style arbitration, "with neutral
umpires weighing competing interests, to strike a just balance").
278. E.g., THE FEDERALIST NoS. 49, 55, 57, 63, supra note 2, at 316, 345, 350, 383.
279. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 290.
2003] THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 51
280writings on government are replete with fiduciary language. John Jay
called public officials "agents and overseers for the people." 281 Tench
Coxe referred to "the trusts and powers of the state.' 282  Several state
constitutions contained language of public trust.
283
Fiduciary status implied fiduciary duties, in particular the duty of
impartiality. The English tradition favored by American Whigs had
emphasized the ideal of government actors rising above "corruption" (the
service of private and local interests) and governing instead as
disinterested promoters of the general welfare.285  At the federal
convention, promoting governmental impartiality was an important
286consideration in the drafting process. Madison reflected that view
when he wrote in The Federalist that government officials should be
"impartial guardians of a common interest.' 287 Even Hamilton, although
280. 2 id. at 123 ("public trust"); id. at 169 ("federal trustees"). In the letters of "Fabius," see,
e.g., 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 122 ("federal trustees"); id. at 124 ("undue
influence"); id. at 124-25 (affirming that presidential electors will reject suggestions "derived from
partiality"); id. at 125 (referring to the senate's "trust" in acquiring and preserving information); id.
at 180 (stating that government is a trust for the benefit of the governed). See also STILLIt, supra
note 2, at 204 (quoting Dickinson as referring to a representative as "a trustee for my countrymen,"
and noting a corresponding duty for the representative to subordinate his own interest to those he
serves).
281. Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 2, at 77.
282. Id. at 146.
283. E.g., DEL. CONST. art. IV, available at The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,
http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalon/states/deO2.htm ("a councilor will remain in trust for three
years"); PA. CONST. art. IV, available at The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa08.htm ("[A]ll power being originally inherent in, and
consequently derived from, the people; therefore all officers of government, whether legislative or
executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them.").
284. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959) ("Duty to Deal Impartially with
Beneficiaries: When there are two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal
impartially with them.").
285. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 45-48 (1967) (citing,
among other points, Bolingbroke's ideal of the "Patriot Prince"); id. at 84-85 (citing Edmund
Burke's description of Parliament as "a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that
of the whole, where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good,
resulting from the general reason of the whole."). For another view of the Whig concept of the
"public good," also called "good of the whole," "general good and safety," and various other terms
presaging "common Defence and general Welfare," see GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 53--65 (1969).
286. See 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 88 (Pierce Butler, stating that unity in the
executive will promote impartiality); id. at 139 (Elbridge Gerry, making the same point); id. at 427-
28 (James Madison, stating that the senate will promote impartiality); id. at 580 (John Randolph,
speaking on the importance of an impartial census); 2 id. at 42 (Gouverneur Morris, speaking on the
importance of an impartial impeachment trial); 2 id. at 124 (Madison, speaking on impartiality in
representation); 2 id. at 288 (Oliver Elsworth, speaking to the desirability of impartial rewards for
merit).
287. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 2, at 297 (emphasis added); see also id. NO. 54, supra
note 2, at 341 (stating that the census should be conducted impartially); id. No. 57, supra note 2, at
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as close to a non-Whig as a non-Loyalist could get, repeatedly praised
the virtues of impartiality, at least in the judicial context.
The ideal of government-as-impartial-trustee was as regnant among
Anti-Federalists as among Federalists. The ideal shines through the
public letters of "Agrippa" (John Winthrop), a Massachusetts Anti-
Federalist who criticized the proposed Constitution because he thought it
would lead to a government not impartial: "I believe that it is universally
true, that acts made to favour a part of the community are wrong in
principle[,] 289 he wrote; "[t]he perfection of government depends on the
equality of its operation, as far as human affairs will admit, upon all parts
of the empire, and upon all the citizens., 290  However, the proposed
Constitution, in his opinion, would give Congress the right to grant
special privileges to some people-exclusive trading charters, a relic of
the royal prerogative,29 1 and monopolies.292 Taxation under the new
government would impact the states unequally.293 "In a republick [sic],"
he said, "we ought to guard, as much as possible, against the
predominance of any particular interest. It is the object of government to
protect them all., 294 Anti-Federalist James Monroe, later President of the
United States, reflected the same view: "There are two circumstances
remarkable in our colonial settlement:-lst, the exclusive monopoly of
our trade; 2nd, that it was settled by the commons of England only. The
revolution, in having emancipated us from the shackles of Great Britain,
has put the entire government in the hands of one order of people only-
freemen not of nobles and freemen.
295
The ideal of impartiality heavily influenced the way the new
Constitution was written and represented. Although the drafters were not
351 (stating that the representation in House of Representatives should be "scrupulously impartial to
the rights and pretensions of every class and description of citizens").
288. See id. No. 65, supra note 2, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton, stating that the Senate has
requisite impartiality to try impeachments); id. No. 78, supra note 2, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton,
discussing need "to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws"); id. NO. 80,
supra note 2, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton, praising use of federal courts where state courts might be
biased).
289. Ford, ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 59.
290. Id. at 74; see also id. at 102 ("The first principle of a just government is, that it shall operate
equally.").
291. See id. at 70 (describing trade charters "as one principal branch of prerogative"); id. at 109
(comparing trade charters to aristocracy).
292. See id. at 80 (stating that Congress should "be restrained from creating any monopolies");
6 Storing, ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 2, at 112 (Robert Yates, using the pseudonym "Sydney,"
discussing monopoly).
293. Ford, ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 74-75.
294. Id. at 109.
295. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 2, at 208-09 (speaking at the Virginia ratifying
convention).
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utopian enough to create a purely fiduciary government, fiduciary
296principles pervade the Constitution. Various sections were crafted to
promote equal regulatory treatment, 297 prevent conflicts of interest, 298 and
call public officials to account. 299  The document speaks explicitly of
"public Trust '300 and of public offices being "of Trust." 30 1  Particular
institutions, such as the unitary executive, the Senate, and the electoral
college, were inserted to promote governmental impartiality.0 2
Several provisions were designed to promote impartiality in fiscal
matters: duties, imposts and excises must be uniform throughout the
country; 30 3 direct taxes must be apportioned by population;30 4 and
revenue bills must be initiated by the House of Representatives (the
branch of government having the most identity of interest with the
people). 30 5  By limiting the purposes for which the new government
could raise (and spend) tax revenue, the General Welfare Clause served
the same end of fiduciary-style impartiality.
296. This number has been increased through the amendment process. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
amend. V (prohibiting the taking of private property without compensation); id. amend. XII
(prohibiting electors from voting for both presidential and vice-presidential candidates from the
same state as themselves); id. amend. Xi1 (abolishing slavery); id. amend. XIV (granting equal
protection of the laws); id. amend. XV (abolishing discrimination in voting due to race or color); id.
amend. XIX (abolishing discrimination in voting due to sex); id. amend. XXVn1 (preventing
Congress from increasing Congressional salaries until an election has intervened).
297. E.g., id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States"); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 ("No Preference
shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of
another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in
another.").
298. Id. art. L § 6, cl. 2 ("No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have
been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased [sic] during such time; and no
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office."); id. art. 11, § 1, cl. 7 ("The President shall ... receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be encreased [sic] nor diminished during the Period for which he
shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the
United States, or any of them.").
299. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.").
300. Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
301. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 ("Office of... Trust "); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Office of Trust").
302. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 88 (Pierce Butler on the executive); id. at 139
(Elbridge Gerry on the executive); id. at 427-28 (James Madison on the Senate); 17 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 124-25 (John Dickinson writing that the electoral college was constructed
so that "utterly vain will be the unreasonable suggestions derived from partiality").
303. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
304. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers ...
.1).
305. Id. art. 1, §7, cl. 1.
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In the spring of 1788, John Dickinson became frustrated by the fact
that several states still had not subscribed to the Constitution.3 °6 In April
and May, therefore, he published his "Fabius" essays, 3°7 his last major
contribution to the constitutional debates. These were initially printed in
Philadelphia, but were soon reprinted widely in states that had not yet• 308 ..
ratified. Pervaded with fiduciary as well as Lockean principles, the
"Fabius" essays dwelt extensively on the goals of general or common
welfare as opposed to welfare merely local or partial.3 °9 In Dickinson's
view, "the end [purpose] of legitimate government . . . is the general
welfare. 31°  Individuals cede to society those rights it would be
destructive to exercise separately so as to better protect those rights best
exercised individually. Similarly, in entering a confederation states must
cede authority over the general welfare for the better protection of their
local interests.31' It followed that the new federal authority was limited
to matters pertaining to the general welfare, and did not extend to local or
special interests. 31 2  "America is, and will be, divided into several
sovereign states, each possessing every power proper for governing
within its own limits for its own purposes ...., It was the duty of
states, Dickinson added, to protect their remaining powers from federal
encroachment.31 4 This resultant balance would bring out the best in the
several states just as union with England had brought out the best in
Scotland: "The cultivation of her virtues and the correction of her
errors."
315
IX. CONCLUSION
The current Supreme Court interpretation, the Hamilton-Story view,
stands the original meaning of the General Welfare Clause on its head.
The Clause was not a qualified grant of spending authority, as Hamilton
306. See 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 77 (noting that publication of
Dickinson's essays was occasioned by "an alarming hesitation of some States to ratify the
Constitution").
307. Id. at 74.
308. Maryland, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York. Id. at 78.
309. The topic of general welfare is a frequent one in the Fabius letters. The first letter, for
example, discusses how sectional and economic interests can warp views of the common welfare.
id. at 81.
310. Id. at 195.
311. This is discussed in detail in the third "Fabius" letter. Id. at 67.
312. Thus, the electoral college was constructed so that "utterly vain will be the unreasonable
suggestions derived from partiality." Id. at 124-25 (emphasis in original).
313. Id. at 249.
314. Id. at 171.
315. Id. at 213.
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and Story claimed.316 Nor did it merely point to other powers, as Story
understood Madison to have said. On the contrary, the General Welfare
Clause was an unqualified denial of spending authority. It did not add to
federal powers; it subtracted from them.
The General Welfare Clause was designed as a trust-style rule
denying Congress authority to levy taxes for any but general, national
purposes. Because the Clause prevented Congress from using tax
revenue for local or special interest purposes, the Clause indirectly
qualified the appropriation power. Even if some enumerated power
could be enlisted to support the appropriation,1 7 federal tax money was
not to be used for the private benefit of a museum-however worthy-in
Savannah, nor an artist-however struggling-in New York.
What was to happen if government officials violated the restrictions
of the General Welfare Clause? Not many of the Federalists addressed
the issue. But three did. David Ramsay ("Civis") rather naively
suggested only electoral retaliation.3 18  Noah Webster suggested that
remedy, but also countermeasures from the states
319 and impeachment. 32°
At the Virginia ratifying convention, Federalist leader George Nicholas
offered the answer most relevant today:
316. Cf. Soifer, supra note 2, at 793-94 (1986) ("It is also a truism, however, that the power
granted to Congress to spend for the general welfare extends beyond purposes explicitly mentioned
elsewhere in the constitutional text.") In light of the discussion above, if Professor Soifer's
statement is a "truism," it would appear to be one of those that are not true.
317. Professor Renz suggests that other enumerated powers are not affected by this limitation,
Renz, supra note 2, at 137-38, but I fail to see why this should be so. The limitation applies by its
terms to tax revenue, and nothing in the document suggests inapplicability to tax revenue funding the
exercise of enumerated powers. Consider the other major limitation in the Taxation Clause--
uniformity of excises. If Congress imposed a sales tax (excise) to fund the military, would that
excise be immune from the rule that it be "uniform throughout the United States?" This seems
unlikely. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §1, cl. 1.
318. 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 2, at 22 ("The people of the United States who
pay, are to be judges how far their money is properly applied").
319. Several other Federalists suggested strong state countermeasures as a cure for potential
federal overreaching. Alexander Hamilton, for instance, noted that
[i]t may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State governments
will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the
public liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under
pretenses so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at
large. The legislatures will have better means of information. They can discover the
danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of
the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can
combine all the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each
other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their
common liberty.
THE FEDERALIST No. 28, supra note 2, at 181. See also id. No. 46 (Madison), at 297-300
(contending that state authority, including the militia power, is a remedy for federal overreaching).
320. Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 2, at 51.
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[W]ho is to determine the extent of such powers? I say, the same power which,
in all well-regulated communities, determines the extent of legislative powers.
If they exceed these powers, the judiciary will declare it void, or else the people
will have a right to declare it void, enforceable ultimately by the courts.
32 1
321. 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 2, at 443.
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